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1.0 Introduction and research question 
 
Since the loss of Schleswig-Holstein in 1864, Denmark has been a small state seeking neutrality 
in the conflicts between the great powers of Europe. World War II was the last time that the 
severe problems Denmark faced in relation to security were highlighted, as German forces 
overran the country within a matter of hours. Denmark was to be occupied for 5 years. After the 
war and as the bipolar structure of the Cold War began to emerge, Denmark, along with many 
other Western European countries signed the Washington Treaty and became members of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO. This organisation was to become the cornerstone in 
Danish security against the new enemy, the Soviet Union. Denmark would be in the frontline in 
the starting great power conflict. This position meant that even though Denmark was a member 
of NATO, it was still necessary to not provoke the Soviet Union too much. Denmark was facing 
a balancing act, which was especially highlighted with the so-called “footnote period” of the 
1980’s. Denmark offered what was requested by NATO, but nothing more. There was not much 
room for manoeuvre, and international military engagements were kept at a minimum. However, 
with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the breakdown of the Soviet Union in the early 
1990’s, Denmark faced an entirely new situation, one that the country had never faced before. 
Gone were the potential great power enemies. Germany for instance, had become a leading 
member of the European Community, the later EU, and Russia was a mere shadow of the former 
might of the Soviet Union.  
 
Today, with the superpower rivalry of the Cold War gone and the major European powers all 
involved in the EU, threats to Danish national security and territorial integrity have all but 
disappeared. Instead of two rivalling superpowers, the United States remain as the sole 
superpower, the only power with global military reach, along with a couple of traditional great 
powers such as France and Great Britain, and a variety of rising great powers such as China, 
India, and Brazil. For Denmark this has meant that it is not a frontline state any longer. In fact, as 
most studies, intelligence risk assessments, and defence commissions since the end of the Cold 
War have highlighted, strategic threats to Danish national security have all but disappeared. 
Reading the Danish Defence Intelligence Service Intelligence Risk Assessment 2011 (DDIS 
2011), one will find that a major part of the publication, which is available to the general public, 
is devoted to looking at the effects of the Arab Spring, al-Qaeda, piracy, and Afghanistan. The 
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matter of a more traditional “near” threat such as Russia is devoted two pages out of the fifty-two 
in the report. Geographically and politically Denmark can thus be considered safer than ever. 
Logically, this should mean that Denmark should live a peaceful existence without having to 
worry about conflict and war, and yet, all Danish governments since the end of the Cold War 
have embarked on at least one international military operation during their tenure. Especially, the 
previous ten years have marked an escalation in the already activist Danish foreign and security 
policy established during the 1990’s, when Danish contingents were dispatched to the Balkans in 
form of UN Peacekeepers in the early 1990’s, and fighter jets during the 1999 NATO bombings 
of Serbia. The two most obvious examples of the operations of the last ten or so years are the 
interventions and subsequent counter-insurgency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, where 
Denmark still has soldiers taking active part in the latter. Two recent examples also include the 
Danish contribution to the 2011 NATO bombings of Libya and the on-going anti-piracy 
campaign in the western Indian Ocean.  
 
With all traditional threats seemingly gone, it is interesting to ask why Denmark has embarked 
on these operations. Some would argue that it is because of the rise of asymmetric threats such as 
international terrorism or refugee flows. However, asymmetric threats are not to be regarded in 
the same manner as the traditional military threats of the past. Earlier in human history, a lost 
war could mean the annihilation of a country’s population. A terrorist attack would hardly mean 
the same, even though the consequences of such an event are both horrifying and massive, such 
as the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States exemplify. As a result, asymmetric 
threats should not be considered the main impetus for engaging in military operations.  
 
Another often heard argument in relation to activism could be that Denmark must remain close 
friends with the United States or risk becoming neglected, due to the unipolarity of the 
international system. This was one of the arguments from then Prime Minister Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen when he had to justify Danish involvement in the American-led invasion of Iraq in 
2003 (Fogh Rasmussen 2003). In Fogh Rasmussen’s view, only the United States could secure 
Danish security, and as such Denmark had to provide support when asked. The question of 
whether Denmark actually got something in return from participating in this conflict was studied 
by Anders Henriksen and Jens Ringmose from the Danish Institute for International Studies, 
DIIS (Henriksen & Ringsmose 2011). In their study, they looked at what Denmark got in return 
Page 6 
 
from the US for the Danish involvement in the Afghanistan and, especially, the Iraq missions, by 
conducting interviews with various key persons in both the Danish and US administrations. They 
concluded that it is highly likely that Denmark has gained increased influence and access, i.e. 
access to key decision-makers in the US administration, as a result of the non-wavering 
engagements by Danish military forces in the two conflicts. However, as it is also recognized by 
the two authors, it is very hard to measure the amount of influence Denmark has gained in the 
halls of power in Washington, D.C. Also, it is worth asking the question of how this influence 
will be repaid. This can be underlined by an analogy to the Cold War, where one of the key 
features of NATO, to quote Lord Ismay, was to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the 
Germans down. Arguably, the Russians were kept out of Western Europe exactly because the US 
had so-called “tripwire” forces stationed in Europe, which meant that an attack by the Soviet 
Union on military installations in Western Europe would cause American casualties, prompting 
an American counter-strike on the Soviet Union. Today, there are no such tripwire forces 
stationed anywhere in Denmark, and indeed it would seem that US forces are being removed 
from Western Europe in the near future because of the US foreign policy “pivot” towards the 
Asia-Pacific. This pivot arguably means that a small country like Denmark would have trouble 
using any acquired access to influence the superpower’s policies in the Asia-Pacific region, even 
though Denmark supported the US-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. In this respect, it 
means that there is nothing logically and explicitly forcing Denmark to participate in these 
operations, especially as there is no existential threat to Denmark today.  
 
Another argument could be that Danish politicians really believe and mean what they are saying 
when seeking to implement peaceful development, respect for human rights, and democratic 
institutions in Afghanistan and Libya, or that Danish national interest is best served by deploying 
a state-of-the-art warship to the Gulf of Aden to fight ill-equipped Somali pirates. However, such 
notions should arguably have had a normative element of continuity in relation to the military 
operations Denmark has participated in, for instance in the form of only participating in mission 
sanctioned by the UN Security Council or engaging only in assistance missions providing aid for 
starving children in Africa. But as a quick overview over the military operations that Denmark 
has participated will show, such a continuity is non-existent, as deployments have been carried 
through with or without sanctioning from the UN, and most of them have been characterised by 
fighting instead of assisting. Instead it would seem that the only element of continuity has been 
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the actual involvement in almost all operations that have been undertaken since the end of the 
Cold War, from the symbolic participation in the first Gulf War to the ongoing anti-piracy 
campaign in the Gulf of Aden.  
 
Arguably this means that there has to be another explanation. Looking beyond normative 
justifications of politicians, or that the international structure means that a state has to act in a 
certain way, it could be argued that the world is a dangerous place whether one likes it or not, 
and states must be able to fight and wage war when it matters. Such an argument would probably 
be provocative, but no less valid than the other two, especially as they struggle to explain Danish 
involvement in the number and type of military operations undertaken. Studying and explaining 
this third notion could thus assist in explaining the rationale behind the activist defence and 
security policy of Denmark.  
 
Consider for a moment a counter argument: If influence or access was the goal, instead of simply 
“buying” influence through contributing to international organizations or international aid to a 
higher degree? As shown above, Henriksen and Ringsmose struggled to find something tangible 
that Denmark had actually received from the US for supporting the Iraq operation, and in 
relation to development aid, it amounts to less than the defence budget even after the election of 
a centre-left government coalition in the fall of 2011, 15.5 billion DKK versus 21 billion DKK 
(dr.dk – Regeringen øger ulandsbistand med 600 millioner; Defence Agreement 2010 – 2014; 
26). Danish participation in international organizations is important, and Danish development aid 
is not low by any means, but it is still interesting that it remains lower than the defence budget 
given that there are not existential threats to Danish security, which makes the argument about 
buying influence irrelevant. The defence budget by itself has actually been maintained along the 
lines of the expenditure of the Cold War in terms of percentage of GDP. In the 1990’s there was 
much optimism that it might be possible to “harvest the peace-dividend”, meaning that defence 
budgets could be cut drastically because the enemy had disappeared. However, while Denmark 
had initially decreased the defence budget after the end of the Cold War, this was hardly the 
“harvest” that had been anticipated. According to a report from the Danish Ministry of Finance, 
Denmark had actually been one of the NATO countries to have benefitted the least from these 
developments (fm.dk – Budgetredegørelse 2003). Since 2001, the actual defence budget has 
remained stable at around 20 billion DKK in 2010 prices, varying between 19.3 billion in 2005 
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to 21 billion from 2010 to 2014. On top of this has been the cost of the ISAF deployment to 
Afghanistan which topped out at 1.2 billion in 2010 (Development in the Danish defence 
budget). Arguably, decreasing the defence budget could have been done, but it would have 
meant that there would not have been possible to implement an activist security and defence 
policy, which is the policy that all governments have undertaken since the end of the Cold War.   
 
Therefore, the question as to why Denmark has embarked on an activist foreign and security 
policy since the end of the Cold War still stands. Explaining and answering this question requires 
looking beyond the arguments presented and criticized above. This paper will therefore seek to 
explain these developments in another light, namely classic realism. The basic rationale in 
realism is that states are the principal actors in international politics, and that states seek power, 
in the sense that they want to either impose their will on others or avoid having the will of others 
imposed on them. They do so because human nature guides the behaviour of states, just like it 
guides the behaviour of people. To classic realists, human nature is to seek power, and this leads 
to conflicts and war.  Classic realism also looks beyond various moral justifications behind 
actions in international politics. In this paper, Hans J. Morgenthau’s theory of international 
politics represents classic realism. In his book introducing various views on international 
politics, Russell Bova (2010) cites Morgenthau as “the preeminent proponent of twentieth-
century realist thinking” (ibid; 17). Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen agree to this view in 
their introduction to international relations by stating that Morgenthau’s book Politics among 
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (1967) was the most influential international 
relations book for several decades following its first publishing in 1948 (Jackson & Sørensen 
2007; 37). Building on these recommendations, it is hard to look elsewhere for a classic account 
of what constitutes classic realism.  
 
Other theories of international politics exist of course, and many of them were born as critiques 
of classic realism’s pessimist view on international politics. One of them is neo-liberalism, for 
instance represented by the complex interdependence thesis from Robert O. Keohane and Joseph 
S. Nye (Keohane & Nye 1977). Their argument is that classical realism is to be considered an 
ideal type, or perhaps a “dystopia” type, of what makes up the international system, and that a 
number of extreme preconditions has to exist in order for realism to of explanatory relevance. 
Keohane and Nye’s main criticism of realism is that it is very simplified view on the 
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international system. Viewing the interactions that states have with one another as merely 
residing in the military/security realm is not an accurate depiction of the complexity of world 
politics. To counter the realist argument, Keohane and Nye argue that their own more liberal 
ideal type, complex interdependence, is as valid to use when discussing international politics. 
Their theory is based on simultaneously challenging the core realist assumptions of international 
politics, namely that states are coherent, rational actors dominating international politics, that the 
usage of force is the ultimate instrument in politics, and that there exists a hierarchy in 
international politics, in which high politics of military security are more important than low 
politics of economics and society. The ideal type that Keohane and Nye present is thus a world 
in which states are still very important actors, although states are seen to be interacting on more 
levels, than simply the state level, which is where classic realism’s level of analysis lies.   
 
According to Russell Bova, most contemporary realists see the international system as a 
structure that forces the states to act in various ways (Bova 2010; 7). This paradigm has been 
named neo-realism, and the most influential scholar in this discipline is Kenneth N. Waltz. 
According to Jackson & Sørensen, Waltz was responsible for putting political realism back on 
the map in the late 1970’s when it seemed that neoliberalism and complex interdependence 
theory was about to become the preeminent international relations theory (Jackson & Sørensen 
2007; 44-45). To Waltz, three core principles shape the structure of the international system, 
namely that it is characterised by the absence of government, that the actors in the system, the 
states, are not differentiated by the functions that they perform, i.e. they are like units, and finally 
that is the capabilities of the various states that differentiate them from each other (Waltz 1979). 
As in classic realism the international system is an insecure place. But unlike classic realists, it is 
not human nature that guides states, but instead the structure of the international system and its 
most defining characteristic, namely the absence of government. This means that international 
politics is a zero-sum game, where self-help the most important and cooperation is scarce, 
because all actors are fearful that other actors might gain more than they do themselves (Waltz 
1979; 107).   
 
Even though both these theories are newer than classical realism, they are not necessarily better 
to use in the analysis that this paper is about to undertake. Keohane and Nye’s paradigm shows 
how developed liberal democracies can avoid going to war with each other because they have 
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become interdependent politically, economically, and socially. They argue that military force is 
not a good tool in a state’s toolbox, as it is only suited for dealing with military force. However, 
as has been shown time and again throughout history, states have gone to war with each other. It 
might not be that the democracies of Western Europe have gone to war with each other since 
World War II, but they have certainly been involved in conflicts elsewhere. Such critique was 
also raised by neo-realist thinking. Even though neither classic realists nor neo-realists argue that 
cooperation between is impossible, they do argue that the search for relative power gains and 
continued self-determination will mean that cooperation will be a function of these factors. Also, 
while states sharing the same form of liberal democracy might not go to war with one another, 
they might come into conflict in other ways (Jackson & Sørensen 2007; 46). As such, Keohane 
and Nye’s theory is well suited to a study focusing on several levels of analysis and when 
studying interdependence between states that have reached similar levels of political and 
economic development, but it is arguably not well suited to a study focusing on why Denmark 
has been involved in almost all available military operations since the end of the Cold War. 
However, neither is neo-realism. Neo-realism focuses almost solely on the great powers, to the 
extent that it sees the most stable form of international structure being a bi-polar structure, as was 
the case in the Cold War. As Waltz argue, “[w]ith only two great powers, both can be expected 
to act to maintain the system” (Waltz 1979; 204). However, the great example of neo-realism 
failed with the end of the Cold War, as the Soviet Union fizzled away, leaving only the United 
States as the remaining super power. Today, with the rise of China, India, Brazil, and a host of 
other states, at least this portion of neo-realism fails to show where things will end. As such, 
predicting the way forward is not neo-realism’s greatest force at the moment.  
 
Arguably, to study why Denmark has pursued an activist security and defence policy since the 
end of the Cold War requires another view, which is what classic realism provides. Traditionally, 
classic realism deals with great powers, just as neo-realism, but as will be argued in this paper, it 
is a valid theory when studying the actions of small powers as well. This is the case because 
small powers have to manoeuvre carefully in international politics, else they risk losing their 
self-determination and very existence. In other words, they have to adapt to the international 
system around them.  
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As will be shown in this paper, activism and the participation in international military operations 
has been a key factor of all Danish governments since the end of the Cold War. Since 1989, five 
different governments have ensured Danish participation in various operations. These operations 
have of course been of different scope and the Danish contributions have varied from F-16 
fighter jets to a submarine. But they are all characterised by activism and the will to deploy 
military force in some form in support of a given operation. Furthermore, the permissions to 
deploy the Danish military have generally been passed in parliament with wide support, the 
initial involvement in Iraq the main exception. As such, it is possible to distinguish Denmark as a 
unitary actor whose actions it is possible to study through classic realist theory.  
 
Therefore, this paper will seek to explain the activist security and defence policy undertaken by 
Denmark since the end of the Cold War in a classic realist perspective, focusing on the actions of 
Denmark as a small state, adapting to the international environment and doing what is necessary 
to maintain self-determination and influence in world affairs.  
 
This paper will thus seek to answer the following research question: 
 
1.1 Research question 
 
Why has Denmark pursued an activist security and defence policy since the end of the Cold War 
despite the lack of clear and defined threats? 
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2.0 Methodology and research design 
 
In this chapter, I will introduce the methodological considerations behind this paper. I will give 
more detailed descriptions as to why Morgenthau’s classic realist theory is a valid theory to 
guide the analysis, introduce the empirical material used, and show why this paper represents 
valid arguments in relation to learning more about Danish security and defence policy.  
 
2.1 Theoretical considerations 
 
Theory provides a looking glass through which it is possible to observe, describe, and study the 
world. It is an enabler of further understanding a given subject. This is also the case in this paper 
which is a study of international politics, and therefore in requirement of a theory that says 
something about international politics. In order to say something new and valuable, it is 
requirement that the theory used fits the subject at hand.  
 
As already touched upon, the main theory used in this paper is political realism in international 
politics. In this paper, it is Hans Morgenthau’s views that are used to exemplify a theory of 
international politics, namely classic realism (Morgenthau 1967). The theory will be described in 
more detail later, and at this moment it will suffice to say a few core views of realism. First, in 
realism, the world in which we all live is not a pleasant place due to human nature itself. Humans 
come into conflict with each other. Next, in the realm of politics, power to make someone do 
what they might otherwise not have done is what matters the most. Third, in the international 
system, states are the actors that matter. States might have completely corrupt or completely 
democratic governments, but this does not matter to realists, as the main level of analysis in the 
international system is considered to be the state level.  
 
From this follows that realists also argue that the most important states are the great powers, as 
they are seen to be locked in a perpetual competition of striving and struggling for power. States’ 
power can be measured in several tangible and intangible ways, but the most important is 
military power, or the ability to fight wars when it matters. Realists would argue that this has 
been the case ever since the dawn of man and that this state of affairs will continue forever due 
to the inherent characteristics of human nature.  
Page 13 
 
 
Initially, reading the above paragraph it becomes hard to fit Denmark into this theory. Several 
empirical assumptions about Denmark which makes this hard comes to mind, for instance that 
Denmark is not a great power by any measure. However, when looking at the core idea of realist 
theory it becomes clear that it is a theory which can be used to say something about Denmark 
and the country’s actions in the international system, as all states are seen to be seeking 
essentially the same things and doing so in the same manner. This is especially the case when 
incorporating a distinct Danish variant of realism in the form of adaptation and activism as 
described by Carsten Due-Nielsen and Nikolaj Petersen (1995). Due-Nielsen and Petersen argue 
that Denmark is a small state, and that the country as a result of this has to tread nimbly in 
international politics, while essentially seeking the same things as much more powerful states. 
 
2.2 Level of analysis 
 
Theories other than classic realism do of course exist, and they can also be used as looking 
glasses when examining Danish foreign and security policy. However, it is important it is 
important to distinguish between them, especially with relation to their various levels of analysis. 
When examining international politics scientifically, it is arguably possible to distinguish at least 
three different levels of analysis: The structural level, the state level, and the sub-state level. 
Besides these three levels, a myriad of various subdivisions can be, and are, made. However, for 
the sake of simplicity, I will use this distinction in the following. In any case, it is important to 
consider which level of analysis that can best be utilized to explain the questions asked. 
 
A theory of international politics based on the sub-state level would focus on how domestic 
actors can seek to influence the foreign policy of a nation. These domestic actors could be 
politicians, corporations, or organizations. Therefore, a sub-state focus on national security could 
focus on interest groups’ influence on national security matters. An example could be how the 
military-industrial complex influences US foreign policy or defence procurement in this respect. 
A structural theory, such as the neo-realism theory of Kenneth N. Waltz (Waltz 1979) would 
seek to explain a nation’s behaviour on the international stage from a structural point of view, 
meaning that it is the structure of the system that influences states to act in a certain manner. A 
theory combining both the structural and sub-state level could be Robert O. Keohane and Joseph 
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S. Nye’s (Keohane & Nye 1977) complex interdependence theory, itself a critique of Waltz’s 
theory.  
 
These theories are in widespread use, and they undoubtedly have their strengths, but also their 
weaknesses. For instance, Waltz’s theory has often been criticised for being too “easy”, for 
instance in the sense of being very good at explaining the Cold War because of its focus on the 
formation of two rival poles being the most logical outcome of the international structure’s 
influence on state behaviour. However, arguably it struggled to explain the end of the Cold War, 
and it is hard to explain the setup of the present international system with one superpower and 
many smaller rising great powers. Also, Keohane and Nye’s theory does a great job of 
explaining why the European powers have avoided war with each other since the end of the Cold 
War, the essence of course being their massive interdependence in economics, politics, and 
society. Arguably, it is not least due to the development of this interdependence that Denmark is 
strategically more secure than ever. But, Keohane and Nye do not allot a whole lot of effort to 
explain what can happen between states that are not interdependent, merely stating that armed 
conflict is not very useful when states are interdependent, but can be useful when they are not. 
Arguably, therefore Keohane and Nye present an image of positivity in international politics, or 
perhaps a utopia, while Waltz presents an image of negativity or dystopia. Perhaps, what is 
needed is not as much a theory that focuses on how the system ought to be, in either sense, but 
instead a theory that seeks to explain international politics as it is.  
 
As already described in the introduction, Morgenthau’s theory is a prime example of classic 
realism, and while it itself has it weaknesses it does undoubtedly have its strengths as well. 
Classic realism’s level of analysis is the state level, and it focuses on the actions of the state and 
statesmen, doing what they can to maximize the interests of the nation that they serve. As will be 
shown later in this paper, all Danish governments’ since the end of the Cold War has followed 
the same path of political activism in foreign politics. Therefore, it is possible to use a level of 
analysis focusing on the state level to study the policy choices that Denmark as such has 
undertaken, without having to look into every little detail of Danish domestic politics during the 
same period as well. Instead, it will suffice to describe in short what has happened and show the 
key activist element of continuity in Danish foreign politics. Having established that it is relevant 
to look at Denmark as a unitary actor in the international political system, a second element of 
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realism is important, namely that of the struggle for power. All states struggle for power, because 
it is what matters for states in relation to self-determination and sovereignty. If a state is not 
powerful enough it might face being bullied into submission by other stronger states. Therefore 
even small states, such as Denmark, can be seen as being engaged in this struggle for power, 
although on a completely different scale than the true great powers. It is these key assumptions 
that make it possible to study Danish foreign policy activism since the end of the Cold War 
through the theoretical perspective of political realism.  
 
2.3 Validity 
 
In his book, Morgenthau underlines that realism sees the world as it is and not how it is supposed 
to be (Morgenthau 1967). He bases this assumption on six basic principles of political realism 
that will be described in more detail later. However, in relation to the validity of classic realism’s 
scientific value in this paper the first principle is interesting because Morgenthau sees human 
nature as the dominator for behaviour in international politics:  
 
“Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by 
objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau 1967; 4).  
 
Therefore, it is given that humans will behave in a specific manner due to their nature. In relation 
to ontology and epistemology, this means that Morgenthau sees human nature as something that 
exists apart from humans’ perception of it. In relation to scientific methodology and theory such 
a view can be considered alike to the paradigm of critical rationalism, the “father” of which is 
Karl Popper (Koch 2005; 79). I will not go into a prolonged explanation and discussion of this 
paradigm. It will suffice to list a few of its defining characteristics and explain their meaning in 
relation to Morgenthau’s theory and the scientific value of this paper.  
 
The aim of critical rationalism as a scientific rationale for research is to explain how to study the 
empirical sciences, e.g. sciences about the physical and social reality, in a manner that nurtures a 
growth of knowledge. Central to critical realism is the point outlined above, namely that reality, 
or the universe or ontology, exists without humans’ acknowledgement of it. In contrast to this is 
idealism which sees everything as ultimately a matter of human perception and 
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acknowledgement of it, at least in its most extreme form (Koch 2005; 79-81). Morgenthau agrees 
to this line of thought, underlined by his view on idealism, which he sees humans as essentially 
good, in international politics as being abstract and based on wishful thinking (Morgenthau 
1967; 4). The ultimate aim of critical rationalism is truth, or absolute knowledge about a given 
subject. This is sought done through the utilization of scientific methods. Critical rationalism 
thus has an element of epistemological realism as well. However, it is also recognized that it 
impossible to uncover the ultimate truth about a given subject, and as a result it becomes 
impossible to prove beyond all doubt that a given statement, or research question, is undeniably 
true or false (Koch 2005; 82-83). A curios side-effect of this is what Popper is especially 
renowned for, namely that it is the attempts to falsify and not verify a given theory that proves the 
theory valid in explaining empirical observations: The more times a theory “survives” attempts 
of falsification, the more explanatory power it gains. It is also this line of thought that results in 
critical rationalism’s focus not on final, true knowledge, but on scientific progress and a 
convergence towards to truth, or more instead of all knowledge about a subject (Koch 2005, 94, 
98). It is in this light that the scientific validity of this paper should be seen. I will not try to 
falsify or corroborate Morgenthau’s theory of international politics, but instead using it as an aid 
in gaining more knowledge about Danish defence and security policy.  
 
2.4 Empirical considerations 
 
Theory is not much use unless it has a purpose. The empirical material used in this paper comes 
in various shapes and forms. It also serves two purposes. First, as the starting point in analysing 
and discussing if there has been continuity in Danish foreign and security policy since the end of 
the Cold War. In order to conduct this study, I have looked into the final reports of the last three 
defence commissions from 1988, 1997, and 2008. The purpose of these reports are to enable the 
politicians in parliament to make informed decisions on defence and security matters, based on a 
valid analysis of the security environment both at the time of their writing and in the future, 
ensuring that their conclusions are valid in a longer time span. Therefore, the reports are also 
quite wide in their scope, and they are based on the thoughts and considerations of politicians, 
officers, and academics. As a result, these reports present a solid starting point for analysis, not 
least because of their description of the security environment and threats that Denmark might 
face at a given time. Because of this, the commissions have also been tasked with coming up 
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with suggestions as to how the Danish military should be structured in order to cope with the 
threats envisaged by the commissions. That these reports are influential is quickly established 
when reading the defence agreements passed by parliament, as the decisions in these agreements 
are based on the foreseen security environment and scenarios posed by the commissions in this 
respect. This is also the case in relation to structure and procurement, where the defence 
agreements have again been influenced to a large degree by the defence commissions’ final 
reports. That this is indeed the case will be underlined further later in the paper. Also, the 
defence commission reports as well as the defence agreements are supposed to be valid for a 
longer time period. For instance, since 1995, all defence agreements have had a five-year time 
span, making sure that there has been continuity in what has been agreed upon in parliament. 
Furthermore, it has been custom to discuss any changes sought during these five-year periods 
among the parties that agreed on passing a given defence agreement. To give an account of the 
many military operations that Denmark has been involved in since the end of the Cold War, I 
have looked into various books and articles on the subject. Most importantly, I have included 
Thomas Wegener Friis’s account of Danish military history since 1945 from Ole L. Frantzen and 
Knud J.V. Jespersen’s book on Danish military history (Frantzen & Jespersen 2008a/b). Also, I 
have used Martin Kaae and Jesper Nissen’s book on why Denmark took part in the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003 as an account of the Danish participation in the Iraq and Afghanistan missions. 
Besides this material, which forms the basis of the empirical material in this paper, a variety of 
articles, books, and websites have been used to provide a valid empirical input where needed.  
 
A critique of the empirical choices made in this paper could relate to the assessments of a given 
security environment described by a given defence commission. For instance, a scenario posed 
by a commission might be challenged by a scenario thought up in think tanks or universities. 
However, such scenarios lack what the defence commission reports have, namely the power to 
influence the decision making in parliament to a large degree. For this reason, the commission 
reports form, at least, a valid starting point for analysis. In other words, the reports and the 
defence agreements stipulate how things are, or how they will be, much in line with the 
theoretical considerations outlined above: One might not like the implications, but these are the 
documents on which policies are made, and as such they are important to look at when studying 
Danish foreign and security policy.     
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2.5 Limitations 
 
Looking at foreign policy of a country can from the outset be very overwhelming and 
problematic. Foreign policy is many things, such as the direct interactions between state 
officials, foreign aid and donations, and of course security and conflict issues. This paper will 
have a narrow focus on what foreign policy, namely a focus on national security for Denmark in 
relation to the various military operations that the country has participated in since the end of the 
Cold War. Therefore, the limitations and focus will be twofold in that there is a historical starting 
point defined by the end of the Cold War, which gave rise to the present unipolar international 
system, and a narrow focus on security issues in relation to the historical and political 
developments since this starting point. I will of course not completely neglect that history has 
taken place before the events beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, but I will not go 
into specific details nor use the period before 1989 as part of any analysis or discussion. 
However, because it is hard to say something about the present without saying something about 
the past, some references to events before the end of the Cold War are included in this paper. 
Also, I do not neglect that foreign policy has other characteristics than mere security issues, but I 
will not go into details with these characteristics, especially because the theoretical starting point 
of this paper does not include any references to international aid for instance: This is a paper on 
the national security of a country in a narrow realist perspective, and as such the actions of 
Danish diplomats in relation to global warming matter little just to give an example. 
 
2.6 Structure 
 
To explain why Denmark has pursued an activist security and defence policy since the end of the 
Cold War, it is necessary to set up a structure that enables this explanation. Also, the research 
question in the beginning of this paper means that there has to be a natural progression in the text 
in order for the various chapters to be relevant to each other and to the research question.  
 
Therefore, this paper will seek to establish that there exists continuity in Danish security and 
defence policy, and that there has done since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, the paper 
will establish that this continuity is based on the adaptation to the international environment by 
Denmark and that this adaptation has led to activism in security and defence policy. In order to 
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do so, I will first describe Morgenthau’s classic realism and Due-Nielsen and Petersen’s 
adaptation and activism thesis, giving the reader an insight into the theoretical framework in the 
paper. Morgenthau’s classic realism forms the theoretical ballast for this paper, and as such it is 
important to give the reader this insight from the beginning. Following this is a description and 
analysis of the developments in Danish security and defence policy since the end of the Cold 
War, including a summary of the many military operations Denmark has participated in during 
this time period. This analysis is conducted by comparing the relevant empirical facts themselves 
with each other, showing how the developments in the defence commission reports has 
influenced developments in the defence agreements passed by parliament in the time period. 
Afterwards, these developments will be analysed in the light of Due-Nielsen and Petersen’s 
adaptation and activism thesis. This analysis will show that the continuity in Danish security and 
defence policy since the end of the Cold War is characterised by adaptation and activism.   
 
Following this I will analyse and discuss these developments in relation to Morgenthau’s classic 
realism, thereby seeking to explain Danish activist defence and security policy in this theoretical 
perspective, answering why there has been, is, and will be need for activist security and defence 
policy for Denmark. Finally, I will seek to put my results into a perspective on the future for 
Danish security and defence policy and whether the present activist line will continue or not.     
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3.0 Classic realism 
 
In this chapter, I will introduce classic realism as understood by Hans J. Morgenthau. I will 
describe the main features of this theory, with a focus on classic realism in relation to a small 
state such as Denmark. As such, I will not go into specific detail with all of Morgenthau’s ideas 
and thoughts, instead focusing on the core ideas of the theory. The chapter will end by specifying 
why the theory is useful when studying Danish security and defence policy.  
 
3.1 Six principles of political realism in international politics 
 
Hans J. Morgenthau argues that all thought of politics can essentially be divided into two schools 
of thought. One sees human nature as essentially good and the other, according to Morgenthau, 
as it is. His argument is that the first view is too naïve, while the other is more realistic, as it is 
backed by historic developments and not abstract principles of morality, such as idealism, and it 
deals with “[…] the realization of the lesser evil than of the absolute good” (Morgenthau 1967; 
4). Political realism, and thus the classic realist view of international politics see human nature 
and the world as it is, with all its imperfections, as opposed to the more idealistic view that 
Morgenthau sees it opposing.  
 
Morgenthau argues that classic realism can be understood on the basis of six fundamental 
principles. The first is that “[p]olitical realism believes that politics, like society in general, is 
governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau 1967; 4). 
Morgenthau’s argument is that human nature is what guides what he calls the laws of politics. 
Morgenthau does not directly describe what he means by human nature, but he does give some 
hints. He sees the world as imperfect and as “[…] a world of opposing interests and of conflict 
among them” (ibid; 3). Following this, human nature, which guides the laws of politics, is 
essentially one of conflict and competition, which is why politics and thus international politics 
are as well. Contrary to this is the abstract view that humans are essentially good, and that 
conflict comes from a “[…] lack of knowledge and understanding, obsolescent social 
institutions, or the depravity of certain isolated individuals or groups” (ibid; 3). Morgenthau 
rejects this view as being founded on abstract principles and subjective judgement and “[…] 
informed by prejudice and wishful thinking” (ibid; 4). It is because that the first view sees the 
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world as it is, with all its conflicts and imperfections, that it has received the moniker realism 
(ibid; 4).  
 
The second principle is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. To Morgenthau, this 
principle is what established politics as a separate branch of science distinguished from 
economics and law for instance. Morgenthau argues that this is how political actors think and 
that it is the only through this view that it is possible to understand their actions: 
 
“The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the 
observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the 
theoretical understanding of politics possible” (Morgenthau 1967; 5).      
 
Because the interest of all actors is power, they all come to share the same characteristics to the 
observer. Morgenthau also argues that it is important to not be concerned with the motives and 
ideology of actors, as these have the ability to lead the observer astray. Knowing the motives and 
ideology of an actor might make it possible to foresee the direction of foreign policy, but it does 
not enable the observer to predict where it this policy will end. As Morgenthau rhetorically asks: 
 
“How often have statesmen been motivated by the desire to improve the world, and 
ended by making it worse? And how often have they sought one goal, and ended 
achieving something they neither expected nor desired?” (Morgenthau 1967; 6).  
 
The underlying point here is that foreign policy and thus international relations are seen as 
rational, and not diffused by irrational motives and underlying ideologies: Foreign policy is an 
arena of rationality and objectivity, not concerns of motives and subjectivity.     
 
The third principle is that realism “[…] does not endow its key concept of interests defined as 
power with a meaning that is fixed once and for all” (Morgenthau 1967; 8). The point here is that 
all states have interests and they seek power, but these interests are bound to change depending 
on the political and cultural setting:  
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“[…][t]he kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history 
depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is 
formulated” (Morgenthau 1967; 8-9).  
 
From this also follows that the way the international system is set up is not perpetual, and that it 
can be transformed. The nation state need not necessarily be the most developed form of human 
political organisation. However, such a transformation would require “[…] workmanlike 
manipulation of the perennial forces that have shaped the past as they will the future” 
(Morgenthau 1967; 9).  
 
The fourth principle is that “[p]olitical realism is aware of the moral significance of political 
action” (Morgenthau 1967; 9). Morality matters in politics in the form that states and statesmen 
must consider moral consequences of the political actions that they seek to undertake as “[t]here 
can be no political morality without prudence; that is without consideration of the political 
consequences of seemingly moral action” (Morgenthau 1967; 10). According to Russell Bova 
this makes up with a prevalent prejudice about realism, namely that it is completely amoral 
(Bova 2010; 17).   
 
The fifth principle is that “[p]olitical realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a 
particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe” (Morgenthau 1967; 10). What is 
meant here is that is important to look beyond the immediate moral justification that a state can 
use to sanction its actions. Morgenthau’s argument is that while some states might justify their 
actions on higher moral grounds, it is rarely, if ever, the case. As Bova argues: 
 
“Many conflicts and wars are about to claims to land, resources, or security in which 
both sides can make legitimate claims, and no state or people has a clear on either 
vice or virtue when it comes to how such claims are pursued” (Bova 2010; 18). 
 
This is also why the idea of interest defined in terms of power is important. Morgenthau argues 
that:  
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“[…][I]f we look at all nations […] as political entities pursuing their respective 
interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to all of them” 
(Morgenthau 1967; 11).  
 
Morgenthau’s idea of justice has two sides, namely that the ability to judge others as well as 
being judged by them enables nations to understand and respect the interests of other nations, 
while still protecting and promoting the nation’s own interests (Morgenthau 1967; 11). Justice to 
Morgenthau thus is another way of describing how to look at the actions of states. In other 
words, it is better to look at states’ interest in terms of power, than looking at the myriad of 
moral grounds for pursuing this interest, if one wants to make sense of international politics.   
 
Finally, the sixth principle is that there is a profound difference between political realism and 
other schools of thought (Morgenthau 1967; 11). Other schools of thought exist of course, but 
only political realism asks questions such as “How does this policy affect the power of the 
nation” (Morgenthau 1967; 11). It is exactly because political realism asks questions about 
power and not economics or morality that it is considered as occupying its own distinct sphere of 
thought. On top of this, Morgenthau argues that it is imperative to keep them divided into their 
different realms. For instance, when looking at the actions of states, it would be easy to confuse 
the legal and moral interests of a state with its political interests. This is not to disregard to others 
as unimportant, but rather that “[…] each should be assigned [to] its proper sphere and function” 
(Morgenthau 1967; 13). 
 
Applying these six principles to international politics has the following consequences. First, 
essential human nature of means that competition and conflict is what guides the way that states 
interact. Political realists see the world as it is and not how it is supposed to be, which in the 
realist view would be how idealists see it. Second and third, politics is about power and interests 
seen as power. Fourth and fifth, it is important to look beyond moral grounds when trying to 
make sense of decisions as an observer as well as it is important to weigh up the moral of 
different decisions that one has to undertake. It is when looking beyond the immediate moral 
justifications that it becomes possible to do justice to states’ decisions. Sixth, political realism is 
a separate sphere of thought because it seeks to answer questions about power and not economics 
and law for instance. The world that classical realism highlights is thus one of conflict. Little can 
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be done to work against this conflict as it comes from the forces of human nature itself, and as 
Morgenthau argues “To improve the world one must work with those forces, not against them” 
(Morgenthau 1967; 4).  
 
3.2 A struggle for power 
 
Following the above, insecurity in the world of the political realist is thus a product of human 
nature and the conflict and competition that comes with it. Because human nature and thus 
politics is essentially about conflict and competition, power becomes important. As Morgenthau 
argues: 
 
“International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate 
aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim” (Morgenthau 1967; 
25). 
 
States may seek to achieve other goals in the areas of economics, society, and religion, but 
Morgenthau argues that when they seek to achieve these goals through international politics, 
“they do so by striving for power” (Morgenthau 1967; 25). This leads to two conclusions, namely 
that states can interact in ways that are not political, and that all states are not always involved in 
international politics to the same extent. International politics is thus very dynamic in relation to 
which states are the most powerful at a given time, and what their interests are if not power 
(Morgenthau 1967; 26). Power to Morgenthau means “[…] man’s control over the minds and 
actions of other men”, with political power referring to “[…] the mutual relations of control 
among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at large” and the 
“[…] psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised” 
(ibid; 26, 27).  
 
This power is to be distinguished from power as mere physical violence, although the threat of 
violence is seen as an integrated part of power. When this threat becomes physical or real 
however, it is no longer considered political power, but instead power in other terms, most 
importantly military power. In Morgenthau’s view it is the armed strength of a nation that is the 
most important material factor in relation to political power in international relations 
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(Morgenthau 1967; 27). As a result of this, it becomes an important political objective to prepare 
militarily in order to be able to apply the political threat of armed force as physical violence, 
should it be needed in order to make another actor do what it might not otherwise have done. As 
Morgenthau writes, “[t]he political objective of military preparations of any kind is to deter 
other nations from using military force by making it too risky for them to do so” (Morgenthau 
1967; 28). In other words, the objective is to be so powerful militarily that an enemy will refrain 
from using military force as a means of imposing his will. From this also follows that the aim of 
war itself is to impose the will of one actor on another and not necessarily conquest (Morgenthau 
1967; 28).  
 
Because political power essentially is about imposing one’s will on someone else, Morgenthau 
argues it becomes important to distinguish whether policies discussed in international relations, 
such as economic or social policies, are undertaken as such or as an instrument of politics of 
power: 
 
“When […] policies serve to increase the power of the nation pursuing them with 
regard to other nations, these policies and their objectives must be judged primarily 
from the point of view of their contribution to national power” (Morgenthau 1967; 
29). 
 
An example here could be economic sanctions and development aid. The first arguably seeks to 
diminish the relative power of the actor on which sanctions are imposed, while development aid 
does not tip the balance of power noticeably. In other words, economic sanctions on a country 
often have political aims, whereas development aid has not. It is because of the struggle for 
power that international politics are considered power politics (Morgenthau 1967; 29).  
 
Morgenthau sees the struggle for power as the key reason for conflict in international politics, 
and he does not agree that more liberal trade policies or the introduction of international 
socialism will decrease or even eliminate conflict in international politics (Morgenthau 1967; 29, 
30). Instead he argues that: 
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“[…] the struggle for power is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact 
of experience. It cannot be denied that throughout historic time, regardless of social, 
economic, and political conditions, sates have met each other in contests for power” 
(Morgenthau 1967; 31). 
 
Following on the above principle of politics being derived from human nature, Morgenthau 
argues that the struggle for power is a distinctive element of all politics, whether it is domestic or 
international. He also argues that this struggle for power goes on every day in everyday human 
interactions, even in families, social clubs, and business organisations. It is merely the conditions 
under which this struggle for power takes place that distinguishes domestic from international 
politics (Morgenthau 1967; 32, 33).  
 
3.3 The struggle for power in international politics 
 
In classic realism, power in international politics is understood as national power, a concept 
which is important in relationship to power between states and what this relationship means for 
security and conflict. Morgenthau defines the concept of a nation as “[…] an abstraction from a 
number of individuals who have certain characteristics in common, and it is these 
characteristics that make them members of the same nation” (Morgenthau 1967; 97). The 
individuals may have different religious or political views and different economic status etc. but 
they share something that makes them belong to the same nation. This means that national power 
is understood as the power of the individuals belonging to the same nation, in other words their 
collective power. The power and foreign policy of the nation is however not in the hands of 
every member of the nation. Instead, it is vested in the hands of the select few who handle the 
foreign affairs of the nation on the international scene. They become the state, acting on behalf 
of the nation in international affairs. As Morgenthau writes: 
 
“[…] [A] nation pursues foreign policies as a legal organization called a state, whose 
agents act as the representatives of the nation international affairs. They speak for it, 
negotiate treaties in its name, define its objectives, choose the means for achieving 
them, and try to maintain, increase, and demonstrate its power. They are the 
individuals who, when they appear as representatives of their nation on the 
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international scene, wield the power and pursue the policies of their nation. It is to 
them that we refer when we speak in empirical terms of the power and of the foreign 
policy of a nation” (Morgenthau 1967; 98).   
 
To Morgenthau, the actors in international politics are thus the states. The concept of statesmen 
is to be understood as the individuals that make up the states, but as Morgenthau defined in his 
second principle above, one should not be too concerned with the motives of statesmen. In 
international politics, it is the actions of states that are to be studied because states, unlike 
individuals, do not have other interests than interests defined as power. However, just like the 
individual seeks power domestically, states seek power internationally. From this follows that it 
is always good to have more power than others, as the state cannot otherwise impose its will on 
other states and thus might face having another state’s will imposed on it.  
 
Morgenthau identifies several factors making up national power, both tangible and intangible. 
For instance, he argue that geography, natural resources, population, industrial capacity, and 
quantity and quality of armed forces as well as more abstract factors such as national character 
and morale, quality of diplomacy, and the quality of government are all important to factor in 
when looking at what compromises national power (Morgenthau 1967; 106-144). It is in the 
interplay between these many factors that national power is found, which also means that a 
country is not necessarily powerful just because it has a massive population, massive armed 
forces, or a strong diplomacy. For instance, even though North Korea has one of the largest field 
armies in the world, it is not considered being very powerful due to antiquated equipment and a 
poor economy, just as well as Denmark is not considered a great power even though it has great 
diplomatic skills. A state must balance its foreign policy with the power available, as well as 
balance the different elements of its national power with each other for exactly these reasons 
(Morgenthau 1967; 139-140).  
 
However, all this also means that it is required to be able to measure or evaluate how much 
power different states have. A key factor to Morgenthau and realists in general is that power is to 
be measured relatively (Morgenthau 1967; 149). Power shifts as time goes by, and when only 
looking at power in absolute terms it is easy to make mistakes when measuring it. Morgenthau 
use the example of France’s power in 1919 in the aftermath of World War I compared to French 
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power in 1939, at the beginning of World War II. French power had not changed much in 
absolute terms, but it had indeed in relative terms in comparison to Germany. Also, it is 
important to not base a measurement of power on the assumption that some factors are never 
bound to change. Finally, it is very important to not base a measurement on a single factor alone, 
such as geopolitics, nationalism, and militarism (Morgenthau 1967; 149-158).  
 
3.4 Balance of power 
 
Morgenthau argues that all politics has three distinctive patterns: A political entity or polity can 
undertake a policy of keeping power, increasing power, or demonstrating power. In relation to 
international politics, states can thus seek to maintain the status quo, pursue imperialism and thus 
alter the distribution of power in its favour, or demonstrate its power in order to pursue prestige 
(Morgenthau 1967; 36). Each of these patterns has their own characteristics which I will not go 
into detail with here. However, because states have an aspiration for power and that they aim to 
maintain, alter, or demonstrate this power, Morgenthau argues that there exists a balance of 
power in international politics. This balance is to be understood as an equilibrium signified by 
“[…] stability within a system composed of a number of autonomous forces” (Morgenthau 1967; 
162). If and the when the equilibrium is disturbed by an external force or an internal component 
making up the system, Morgenthau argues that the system will either restore the original 
equilibrium or create a new one (Morgenthau 1967; 162). Morgenthau describe two assumptions 
underlining all equilibriums, namely that the elements of the system are necessary to uphold the 
system and thus exist for a reason, and that without an equilibrium among the elements or actors 
it is possible for one of them to gain the upper hand and thus dominate and ultimately destroy the 
others. The purpose of such an equilibrium thus becomes to “[…] maintain the stability of the 
system without destroying the multiplicity of the elements composing it” (Morgenthau 1967; 
163). Therefore the various actors in the system must be allowed to be strong enough to take care 
of themselves, while still not being strong as to being able to overtake the others. Morgenthau 
also argue that there exists balances of power on several levels, a notion which he coins 
dominant and dependent systems. The argument is that the entire international system has a 
balance of power of its own, while local areas have a balance of power of their own, while still 
being subject to what goes on in the global, dominant system (Morgenthau 1967; 191-195). 
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3.5 Patterns of the balance of power 
 
Because of the characteristics of the international society, namely that it is made up of several 
states who are striving for power, the balance of power finds its expression in two main patterns; 
direct opposition and competition. Morgenthau exemplifies the first with nation A pursuing an 
imperialistic policy towards nation B, where nation B counters it with either an imperialistic 
policy of its own or a policy of its own. In this case, nation B opposes nation A directly. Another 
example is where nation A pursues an imperialistic policy towards nation C, which nation C 
either opposes or accepts, while nation B pursues a policy of either imperialism or status quo in 
relation to nation C. In this case, nations A and B are competing over domination of nation C 
instead of directly opposing one another. In such situations the balance of power is established 
on the basis of nations A and B trying to gain the upper hand over the other. This will likely lead 
to an escalation with the two actors increasing their power in relation to each other until they 
either give up their imperialistic policies all together or one of them believes it have achieved a 
decisive advantage over the other. The outcome will either be one of the two actors yielding or a 
war which will settle the final score (Morgenthau 1967; 166-168).  
 
Morgenthau argues that the latter example shows one of the contradictions in the theory of the 
balance of power. The balance or equilibrium is supposed to ensure an equal distribution of 
power between the actors in the system. However, because actors will seek to either dominate 
others or keep the status quo intact, the power of the actors in the system will be subject to 
change. In other words, the power relations between the states are unstable. From this follows 
that the independence of states can become threatened if other states gain a decisive advantage in 
the system (Morgenthau 1967; 167-168). Therefore, 
 
“[T]he independence of the respective nations can rest on no other foundation than 
the power of each individual nation to prevent the power of the other nations from 
encroaching upon its freedom” (Morgenthau 1967; 168).  
 
This principle is taken further in the pattern of competition. The example Morgenthau uses to 
show this is essentially the same as the latter one described above. Nations A and B compete 
over dominance of nation C. The independence of nation C becomes a function or result of the 
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competition between A and B and the policies that they follow. In other words, C might lose its 
independence if one of the other actors becomes too powerful in relation to the other, while also 
pursuing a policy of imperialism towards C. The possible outcomes are that the nation following 
a policy of status quo become powerful enough to thwart of the imperialistic policy of the other 
and thus maintain the independence of C, or that both A and B switch their focus to another 
weaker actor (Morgenthau 1967; 168-170). 
 
The balancing act itself can be carried out by various methods, although Morgenthau argues that 
the main principle and method that any nation would undertake to maintain the status quo or re-
establish a balance of power is that of armaments, or military power. The idea is that nation A 
invests in more or new arms, which nation B then has to do as well. This leads to continued 
escalation, or an arms race. Examples of this are the British and German rivalry in the period 
leading up to World War I to build the most powerful battleships and the rivalry between the 
United States and the Soviet Union to build the most powerful nuclear weapons and the most 
effective means of delivering them during the Cold War. But because arms races often lead to 
the balance of power becoming very unstable, and the fact that arms races are very expensive to 
undertake, they can also lead to disarmament agreements, which in turn stabilizes the balance of 
power (Morgenthau 1967; 172-174).  
 
Alliances between states are also considered common in relation to re-establishing or 
maintaining the balance of power. States, as written above, can seek to increase their own power 
relative to the other states in the system. But because the system is made up of several states, 
they can also seek to include the power of other nations in their own power, or they can seek to 
ensure that their direct opponents cannot include the power of others in their own. Alliances are 
thus formed as a result of the two latter examples. However, there are some caveats, namely that 
states only enter alliances if their interests oblige them to do so. States will not enter alliances if 
they consider their own power strong enough to secure themselves or if the benefits of entering 
the alliance are outweighed by the commitment undertaken (Morgenthau 1967; 175). In other 
words, the alliance must be a benefit to all taking part in it, otherwise it is doomed.  
 
3.6 Discussion of classical realism 
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At this point it would be advantageous summarize and discuss Morgenthau’s views and to take a 
look at the world that classical realism theorises to exist, and show why this matters even for a 
small state like Denmark. Morgenthau’s six principles of political realism show that it is 
essentially human nature that guides how states interact. Humans are considered to be essentially 
striving for power, in order for them to be either free from oppression from others or to impose 
their own will on others. This means that human nature is essentially one of conflict, because 
humans will compete for power, and thus essentially the ability to decide for one self, in every 
which way they can. This also means that to observers it is important to not become entangled in 
various moral dilemmas in relation to why humans act the way they do. Humans seek interests 
defined as power, and it is best to observe and study their interactions through this view, as it is 
the only way in which it is possible to deduce anything about how they really behave, instead of 
focusing on how they ought to behave, just as Morgenthau sees the idealist view opposing 
political realism doing.  
 
Likewise, in international politics it is human nature that guides the states, to do what they do. 
States compete with each other for power, because it is in their interest to do so. States might 
seek to gain advantages in other fields, such as economics and culture, but the underlying goal in 
international politics is acquiring more power, relatively to the other actors in the system. 
Because of this, it is the relative relationship of the power among nations that matter in 
international politics. Therefore, it is important to not only gain an absolute increase in the power 
of the nation if the competitor’s increase is tenfold measured in absolute terms.  
 
Because the international system is inherently a system of conflict and competition, states 
engage in various policies ensuring that they always maintain or gain power. States can work 
together, but they will only do so if it in their explicit interest to do so. States seek one thing, 
power, and all other considerations come after this. The international system that Morgenthau 
introduces us to is therefore inherently insecure, especially as any moral smooth-talking done in 
the engagements between states is always hiding the fact that the only thing that the state seeks is 
more power than their competitors. As a result, states must secure themselves if they want to 
maintain their independence and self-determination, and the principle way of doing this is 
militarily, in order to assure that any attack would lead to unacceptable losses on the part of the 
attacker. Thus, maintaining the somewhat negative outlook of the realist theme, the most 
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important thing in relation to military power is not to able to win a given war, but to be able to 
inflict so many casualties that an opponent will refrain from attacking in the first place. In the 
grim world of realism, killing is the business, and therefore states must be good at conducting 
this business. And they must be able to demonstrate that they can and will do business if certain 
circumstances are met.   
 
When Morgenthau wrote his book, the world was arguably still recovering from the wounds of 
World War II, and the US was engaged in the Vietnam War. In these wars the benchmarks for 
success were very different than today, and measuring how much military power a state had was 
arguably easier compared to today. Military power today has become very complex, especially in 
the sense that it is arguably no longer the number of tanks or fighters that should be used as the 
benchmark of such power. Today, the destructive power of weapon systems mean that even 
small powers can wield a military that possesses much destructive force. An example of this 
could be the new series of frigates procured for the Royal Danish Navy, as these are all designed 
around a missile launcher capable of firing cruise and air defence missiles against many different 
targets at the same time. Inflicting casualties that will dissuade enemies from attacking has thus 
become something that even small powers can do. However, while developments in technology 
may have offset many of the advantages of simply having more material, it is still important to 
have well drilled soldiers, preferably led by non-commissioned officers and officers who 
themselves have been in combat, and who therefore knows the dangers of the modern battlefield. 
This was underlined by the then newly appointed Chief of Defence, Peter Bartram, in interviews 
with Danish newspapers. Bartram argued that the Danish army has received invaluable 
experience by being involved in high intensity conflict in Afghanistan, and that it is important 
maintain this expertise in the armed forces, in spite of the intended drawback from Afghanistan 
in 2014 (Berlingske 26 March 2012b; Politiken 26 March 2012). It would seem that knowing 
how to fight could come to mean the difference in a conflict that could come from anywhere, and 
in classic realism this could be what prevents war from breaking out in the first place.   
 
3.7 Realism in relation to small states 
 
Morgenthau argues that the power of a state should be measured relatively to other states, and 
that it should be based on a wide variety of variables, such as territory, population, industrial 
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base etc. Using such a calculation is it fairly easy to define Denmark as a small state in the 
international system. Denmark might be powerful compared to Luxembourg for instance, but it 
is a small power compared to Germany, Great Britain, France, and especially the United States 
and China. As such, Denmark is without a doubt a small power. Classic realism focuses on the 
actions of the great powers to a large degree.  A prime example of this is underlined by the idea 
that the very sovereignty of smaller states being maintained through the balance of power and 
competition between two or more larger states. However, it is arguably a theory that can be used 
in relation to all states, Denmark included, even though they do not have as much power as the 
great powers. As written above, states share the same characteristics and they seek the same 
things, and indeed Morgenthau writes that it is only when looking at nations and states in this 
manner that it is possible to study them. It is for this reason that they can be viewed as unitary 
actors seeking to maximize their main interest defined as power. In classic realism, all states do 
just that, either to impose their will on others or to ensure that other states do not do it against 
them. Self-determination is important. In relation to Denmark this means that it will have to tread 
carefully on the international stage, due to the fact that Denmark is a small state. Being able to 
adapt to, and manoeuvre skilfully, in international politics is therefore a prime objective for 
small states. The following will therefore introduce and discuss a certain kind of realism, namely 
the adaptation and activism thesis, which is very useable when studying small states in a realist 
world. 
 
3.8 Realism in a Danish perspective – adaptation and activism 
 
As specified above, realism deals mainly with great powers. However, realist considerations and 
assumptions can be applied to a small state like Denmark as well. States share the same 
characteristics and seek the same thing, most notably self-determination and continued survival. 
As such, a small state also seeks power, but as described above, the self-determination and very 
sovereignty of a small state can be the outcome of the relations between the great powers. And 
while small states might also possess advanced military equipment capable of inflicting mass 
casualties on an attacker, it is important to remember the notion of relativity in power relations 
between states; a small state might have something, a great power will almost certainly have 
more. As such, small states will have to tread carefully on the international stage, adapting to the 
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environment. This was especially the case for Denmark between the catastrophic defeat to 
Prussia and Austria in 1864 and the end of the Cold War.  
 
In their look at Danish foreign policy developments between 1967 and 1993, Carsten Due-
Nielsen and Nikolaj Petersen (Due-Nielsen & Petersen 1995) look at Denmark in  a realist small 
power view, which sees Danish foreign policy as very pragmatic and influenced to a great extent 
by developments in the international system. They look at several variables, but in the following, 
I will concentrate on their views in a narrow perspective of security and defence issues.  
 
3.9 Influence capability and stress sensitivity 
 
Since the catastrophic defeat to the German coalition in 1864 and the loss of Schleswig-Holstein, 
Denmark has been a small state. That Denmark has had to tread carefully on the international 
scene has been characterised by several foreign ministers, most notably by Erik Scavenius who 
was foreign minister during both World Wars, which saw Danish acquiescence to Germany. 
Due-Nielsen and Petersen argue that this has led to adaptation to both external and internal 
variables in Danish foreign policy. They identify two overall variables which have influenced 
Danish foreign policy in the form of “influence capability” and “stress sensitivity”. The 
capability to influence other actors in the system depends on both the structure of the 
international system as well as the capabilities of an actor. Stress sensitivity is based on the same 
factors and is a way of looking at a state’s exposure to foreign influence. The influence 
capability/stress sensitivity matrix can be divided into four distinct areas. First, a state which has 
a high degree of both influence capability and stress sensitivity will likely seek a policy of 
balancing, which means that the state will have to lead an offensive, balancing policy in order to 
not become more sensitive or loose influence. Contrary, a state with both low influence 
capability and low sensitivity will likely lead a policy of quiescence, where a state is only 
involved in international relations to a minimal degree. In between, there is the possibility of 
having a low stress sensibility combined with a high degree of influence capability, which makes 
it possible for a state to follow a policy of dominance. This is the traditional characteristics of 
global or local great powers. Finally, there is the possibility of low influence and high stress 
described above.  
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Traditionally, Denmark has had a low capability to influence others as well as a high sensibility 
of being influenced from abroad, which according to Due-Nielsen & Petersen has meant that 
Denmark has had little choice in order to overcome this predicament but following a policy of 
acquiescence, or bandwagoning.  However, they also argue that Denmark abandoned this policy 
by joining NATO in 1949, instead adopting a policy of balance of power by becoming part of 
one alliance in the looming Cold War bipolarity (Due-Nielsen & Petersen 1995; 12-17).  
 
Being both a frontline state in the Cold War and a NATO member had several implications for 
Danish security policy. NATO membership meant that Denmark became tied militarily to West-
Germany in NATO’s Baltic Command. Due-Nielsen & Petersen argue that this meant that 
Denmark followed a policy of balancing the Soviet Union through the alliance membership, 
especially during the first decades of the Cold War. However, Denmark was not the perfect ally 
in NATO during the Cold War, not least due to relatively low Danish defence spending and 
maintaining a policy of avoiding foreign bases and nuclear weapons on Danish soil. Overall 
therefore, besides balancing, quiescence was the main policy undertook by Denmark during the 
Cold War (Due-Nielsen & Petersen 1995; 32).  
 
It is clear that in Due-Nielsen and Petersen’s analysis, Denmark has been used to adapting to 
external developments. Until the end of World War II, the overarching threat to Denmark was 
Germany. This meant that a policy of bandwagoning and acquiescence was followed in relation 
to the big and powerful southern neighbour. In this analysis, Denmark had a high sensitivity to 
stress and a low capability to influence others. Looking at the external environment for Denmark 
during the Cold War it is clear that two choices could be made: Either, Denmark could join 
NATO or become a neutral country such as Sweden. Doing the first would lead to an alignment 
with the US, while the latter would highly likely lead to an increased Soviet influence, in the 
manner of Finland. 
 
Even though NATO-membership was eventually the chosen path, Denmark was hardly an ally 
that could be counted on, simply because of the close proximity to the Soviet Union. Following 
Due-Nielsen & Petersen’s analysis, Denmark’s stress sensitivity and influence capability hardly 
increased much by joining NATO as the main adversary was still very near geographically, 
which is probably a reason for refusing to allow foreign bases and nuclear weapons in Denmark 
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in peace-time. This is further underlined by the fact that the absence of foreign bases and 
permanent military personnel, meaning that no US “tripwire” forces were present in Denmark. In 
other words, balancing might have been the overall policy of NATO, which is where Denmark 
got its security guarantee from, but Danish policy was probably more one of quiescence, or 
remaining as quiet as possible in relation to the Soviet Union, while still doing just enough to 
satisfying NATO allies. It is thus more rewarding to look at Denmark as a small state simply 
seeking to maintain self-determination through pragmatic policies in the risky international 
environment of the Cold War, than to look at the country as bandwagoning completely with the 
US, because of the sensitivity of the close proximity of the Soviet Union and the stresses that this 
could induce on Denmark, and the low influence that Denmark could wield in international 
relations. Adaptation surely seems to have been a mainstay in Danish foreign policy during the 
Cold War, which is of course also the two authors’ main argument (Due-Nielsen & Petersen 
1995; 50). 
 
Following Due-Nielsen & Petersen’s model, the end of the Cold War meant that the traditional 
fear of a geographically near, powerful enemy vanished. The Soviet Union had been carved up 
into several states, most notably Russia, and Germany had become a key member of both NATO 
and the EC. Danish stress sensitivity thus became lower than it had ever been, while the 
capability to influence other internationally became relatively higher (Due-Nielsen & Petersen 
1995; 34, 50). Following the adaptation model, the absence of threat meant that Denmark could 
become more involved internationally without fear of repercussions from powerful nearby states. 
In other words, an activist foreign policy could be undertaken, including an activist security and 
defence policy.  
 
3.10 Summary 
 
Thus, while Due-Nielsen & Petersen’s model is simple, it gives a good explanation of Danish 
security and defence policy both during and after the Cold War, because it highlights the 
concerns that a small state has to deal with in an international system where conflict could 
potentially come from anywhere, especially for a small state. It serves as a good starting point in 
relation to showing that there has been a continuation in Danish foreign, security, and defence 
policy, in the form of adaptation to the international environment. When stress sensitivity was 
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high and influence capability was low, Denmark sought to please both sides of the Cold War 
conflict by both seeking security guarantees in the form of NATO membership, while not 
provoking the Soviet Union too much, thus maintaining cold albeit amicable relations with the 
USSR, and at the same time maintaining relative Danish self-determination. In the following 
chapters it will be shown that this model can also be used when looking at Danish security and 
defence policy following the Cold War in the context of the activist security and defence policy 
in the time since 1989.      
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4.0 Developments in Danish security and defence policy since 1989 
 
Since the late 1980’s, Danish security and defence policy has been in large part formulated on 
the basis of recommendations from a various defence commissions, consisting of politicians, 
military personnel, and academics. As such, the commissions have been able to draw upon a 
wide array of knowledge and thought to come to their conclusions. The aim of the commissions 
has been to look ahead and specify how developments in several areas, such as political and 
technological, can come to affect the security environment for Denmark. As will be shown 
below, the commissions’ reports have all had a profound influence on the various Defence 
Agreements passed by parliament since the end of the Cold War. Beginning with the 1995 – 
1999 Defence Agreement, these have all had a five-year timespan. While this paper focused 
primarily on the period following the Cold War, I have included a brief description of the 1988 
Defence Commission’s report and a description of the Danish military in the late 1980’s for 
comparison’s sake. In this chapter, I will show how the various Defence Commissions have 
influenced Danish security and defence policy by comparing the recommendations of the reports 
with what was actually implemented in a given Defence Agreement. In the next chapter I will 
analyse and discuss these results in relation to the adaptation and activism thesis.  
 
4.1 The Defence Commission of 1988 and the Danish military in 1989 
 
The Defence Commission of 1988’s final report on recommendations for Danish security policy 
and the country’s armed forces was published in 1989. It bore clear indications of the historical 
events that were unfolding as the commission was discussing what should be the structure of 
Danish security policy and the Danish armed forces of the 1990’s. Central to the report were the 
East-West relations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, and therefore considerations 
about disarmament, nuclear weapons, and general Soviet military strength were central to its 
conclusions. As a result, it was written very much in Cold War terminology, exemplified by 
importance of the defence of the Jutland-peninsula in case of a Warsaw Pact attack in the report 
(Final report – Defence Commission of 1988; 67). Its predictions in relation to the security 
environment for Denmark were based on two scenarios placed at either end of a scale between 
worst case and best case. In the best case scenario, disarmament and treaties on cutting the 
number of nuclear warheads between the two blocs would lead to reduces tensions, which was 
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supposed to lead to a predicted 50% cut in conventional capabilities for the NATO countries by 
2000 (ibid; 135). The worst case scenario envisaged a Soviet return to the Brezhnev-doctrine of 
re-armament and increased repression of dissidents, and the subsequent impact this could have 
on the tensions between the two blocs. However, this was seen as a very unlikely scenario, with 
a more likely worst case scenario being the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact leading to the rise of 
nationalist and ideological differences in the nations of the eastern bloc (ibid; 133-136).  
  
The recommendations for tasks and purposes of the Danish armed forces given by the 
Commission were that they should be an integral part of the country’s security policy, and that 
the Danish military as a result must be able to prevent war, maintain sovereignty, securing self-
determination, and promote a peaceful development in the world. The underlying feature of the 
Danish military should be that it must be prepared to fight a war with the Soviet Union and its 
allies, alongside Denmark’s NATO allies (ibid; 93). This was also highlighted in the 
Commission’s recommendations for defence procurement in the 1990’s, where the focus was on 
equipment designed for large scale, high intensity warfare, such as NBC-protective combat 
clothing, MLRS rocket artillery, anti-ship missile defences, and updated air-defence systems 
(ibid; 130-131). 
 
Thus, in the end of the 1980’s, Danish security policy was still tied up to Cold War alliance 
thinking in which Denmark was a frontline state. This required maintaining a vast amount of 
both soldiers and materiel, needed to counter the anticipated Warzaw Pact invasion of both the 
Jutland peninsula and the Danish archipelago. NATO was to be a key part of this, as the report 
from the commission underlines that: 
 
“The Danish armed forces, based on Denmark’s exposed strategic situation, cannot 
work in a war-preventing manner to an adequate degree. The prevention of war is 
therefore to be sought through Danish membership of NATO and the combined, 
Denmark included, defence effort” (Final report – Defence Commission of 1988; 93, 
author’s translation). 
 
As acknowledged by the members of the Commission, Denmark could not defend itself because 
of the exposed geographical position as a frontline state in the Cold War. Therefore, Danish 
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security policy was tied to NATO and to offering an adequate contribution to the combined 
effort of the alliance, in order to become sufficiently secure. In war time, the Danish armed 
forces would work alongside NATO allies in defending the southern part of the Jutland 
peninsula as well as ensuring superiority at sea in the Baltic (ibid; 67, 68-69). In other words, 
Denmark simply had to hold fast until help could come from the outside, exemplified by 
NATO’s plans for the defence of Denmark in the mid 1980’s. These plans focused on that 
Denmark should relatively quickly receive reinforcements from the lightly armed Allied 
Command Europe Mobile Force, AMF, in case of an immediate emergency. If more time was 
available to respond, i.e. in the build-up phase of an escalation crisis between East and West, 
more heavily armed forces from the UK and the US were to arrive in Denmark, along with 
contingents of fighter jets from the US, UK, and Canada (Friis 2008; 312)1.  
 
The Danish armed forces themselves were focused on presenting a credible obstacle towards a 
Warsaw Pact air- and seaborne invasion force on Zeeland. In case the enemy landed, Danish 
soldiers were to make sure than any gains they made would come at a high cost. Before any 
enemy force could land however, it would first have to face the Royal Danish Navy. The Navy’s 
primary objective was to present as many obstacles as possible for the Eastern Bloc’s naval 
forces. This was to be done by laying mines in strategically important waters along the Danish 
coast, and by employing submarines and the WILLEMOES-class missile boats. As shown here, 
most operational plans focused on the defence of Denmark proper. As such, the defence of 
Bornholm was not given much consideration, as it was anticipated that it would fall quickly if 
the Warsaw Pact decided to attack. Furthermore, in the event of a war, the defence of the Faroe 
Islands and Greenland would fall to Denmark’s NATO partners in the form of the US and the 
UK (Friis 2008; 314). 
 
In the light of the 1988 Commission report, the 1990’s would be very much like the 1980’s and 
1970’s. The main, if not only, enemy in almost every sense of the word would be the Soviet 
Union and its allies. It was also acknowledged that Denmark could not defend itself, but that the 
country still needed to present both a credible threat and ally, in the sense that the military should 
be “mean” enough to ensure that it could hold fast until NATO reinforcements arrived. This 
                                                 
1
 However futile these notions might have been in the light of the recent disclosure of the Warzaw Pact-plans to 
simply nuclear bomb Denmark into submission in the event of the outbreak of hostilities has, luckily, never been 
found out in practice (Friis 2008; 304). 
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meant that there had to be a balancing act in defence posture, in the sense that Denmark’s NATO 
allies, as well as the opposing Warsaw Pact, had to be ensured of Denmark’s will to defend itself 
while maintaining an overall non-provocative policy towards to Soviet Union and its puppet 
states. This was underlined by the so-called “Footnote period” in the 1980’s, where the 
Conservative government had its hand forced in matters of national security by the opposition, 
led by the Social Democratic Party (Friis 2008; 326).  
 
4.2 Developments in the 1990’s and the “Future’s Defence” 
 
The ink on the 1988 Commission’s report would eventually end up not being completely dry 
before world events meant that most of its conclusions were rendered irrelevant. The fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989, the fall of many Communist leaders in the Eastern Bloc in 1988 – 1989, and 
Soviet Prime Minister Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika policies, eventually led to 
the demise of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. The de-facto end of the Cold War with the 
fall of the Berling Wall did not mean that conflict as such did no longer exist however. In the 
Persian Gulf, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq chose to invade neighbouring Kuwait, and participation in 
ousting the invaders would become Denmark’s first engagement on the international scene 
following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Danish participation meant the symbolic deployment of the 
corvette OLFERT FISCHER to the Persian Gulf, and later the deployment of a team of medical 
personnel to Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, a military hospital was set up in the barracks of 
Holstebro, and a transport aircraft was assigned to airlifting wounded allied soldiers (Friis 2008; 
335). Compared to later Danish actions, the degree of participation can be debated, but the tone 
had arguably been set.     
 
For the Danish military as such, the end of the Cold War had initially meant that there had been a 
slight reduction in the size of the armed forces, a lowering of the general readiness level, and not 
least a strengthening of the capability of the Danish armed forces in relation to international 
operations. These changes were first agreed upon by parliament in 1992, and they were further 
improved in the next Defence Agreement between 1995 and 1999. One of the most significant 
results of these changes was the transformation of an army brigade into the Danish International 
Brigade which, along with various support units, was assigned to NATO’s reaction forces. 
Structurally, the fighting force of the army had been reduced to 58.000 soldiers, down from 
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72.000, and the conscription period had been reduced by one month (Final report – Defence 
Commission of 1997; 186, Defence Agreement 1995 – 1999). The navy had also seen a 
reduction in force, especially significant in relation to the reduction of the number of active ships 
and their corresponding personnel, as well as a reduction in the anticipated procurement of new 
vessels (ibid; 240). Cuts in systems and personnel had also been imposed on the air force, which 
had seen a cut in personnel as well as the decommissioning of all F-35 Draken fighters (ibid; 
300).  
 
The first real test for the newly reorganized Danish armed forces came in the Balkans. During 
the communist reign in Yugoslavia, government oppression had been sufficient to keep the 
patchwork of different ethnicities and religions that made up the country separated. However, as 
first Slovenia and subsequently Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina declared independence in the 
early 1990’s, old animosities sprang back to life, and Danish peace keepers wearing blue UN 
helmets would eventually be deployed to Croatia, and later to Bosnia-Hercegovina where they 
would come face to face with the grim realities of modern civil war. Danish soldiers and tanks 
were deployed to Tuzla in Bosnia to maintain a UN sanctioned safe area, and they would 
eventually become involved in several skirmishes with local militias, including a famous episode 
where Danish tanks defeated Bosnian Serb positions in response to artillery strikes on a Swedish 
observation post. 5 Danish soldiers lost their lives in Bosnia, and many more would return with 
what is today known as post-traumatic stress disorder, PTSD (Friis 2008; 341-343). 
 
4.3 The 1997 Defence Commission’s report 
 
As decided in the 1995 – 1999 Defence Agreement, a new Defence Commission was to be set 
up. In 1997, the Commission released its final report aptly named Fremtidens Forsvar or The 
Future’s Defence. In the report, it was quickly recognized that the security environment for 
Denmark had changed considerably since the end of the Cold War, taking into account both the 
structural changes of the armed forces described above and the fact that Denmark was by then 
involved in a massive peace keeping operation in Bosnia. This was highlighted in the scenarios 
foreseen by the Commission in relation to the security environment. Instead of scenarios that 
more or less envisaged the continued existence of a clearly defined enemy somewhere in the 
geographical vicinity, the scenarios set out by this defence commission all had the similarity of 
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being based on the main assumption of the commission’s report, namely that there would be no 
conventional military threat to Danish security for at least the ten coming years after the 
publishing of the report (Final report – Defence Commission of 1997; 81). Instead, the threats 
were seen to have become more diffuse, shown at the beginning of the report with a rethinking 
of the notion of security in the form of more conventional threats and unconventional ones, 
thereby including political, economic, and cultural aspects when thinking about military issues. 
Furthermore, the report acknowledged that issues such as the environment, refugees, and cross-
border crime could eventually become security problems in their own right (ibid; 17).  
 
However, while the report argued that such notions would have to be taken seriously in the 
future, it is clear that the report’s focus in on traditional international politics, such as Denmark’s 
position in the international system and security issues in that respect. The commission saw three 
scenarios with varying probability likely to emerge in international politics. The first and most 
likely scenario consisted of an international system whose main characteristic was a global order 
led by the United States. This would mean a broad view on security being the most prevalent, 
with a focus on refugees, disasters, pollution, and international crime. Military threats were seen 
mainly in the form of state-sponsored terrorism and so-called rogue states, armed with weapons 
of mass destruction. Maintaining the global order would be a main focus of the US and its allies. 
As such small, regional conflicts would probably still be highly likely. However, should such 
conflicts come into conflict with the interests of the international system, i.e. the interests of the 
US and its allies, the authors argued that an armed intervention would most certainly be launched 
by a US-led coalition. Following this, it was anticipated that technological developments in 
military hardware would have come to mean that coalitions led by the US would have a strong 
advantage in combat. This conclusion was no doubt based on the spectacular results shown by 
US and Allied airpower in the 1991-1992 Gulf War. Peacekeeping missions were seen to be a 
key subject in security policy, and such missions were not only to be carried out in the near 
geographical region, but on a much more global scale. The reason for this was that to maintain 
the global order, interventions in far flung areas of the world were deemed necessary. This was 
also the case for Europe, and thus for Denmark, not least because Europe was seen as having an 
interest of its own in maintaining the global order. NATO was also seen as the key military 
organisation for both the US, Europe, and Denmark. The most direct competitor to US 
hegemony was seen to be a developing China focusing on military development. However, the 
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Commission underlined that it did not see China as valid competitor to the US for the 
foreseeable future of 10-15 years (ibid; 69-70). 
 
The second scenario was a developing multipolarity, with the EU as one of the power centres. 
The characteristics of this multipolarity were considered to be more “normal” in the sense that 
the poles, or great powers, were going to cooperate to the extent that they are not locked in too 
tight in alliances and partnerships, in order for them to maintain their freedom of action. As such, 
most cooperation between the great powers was seen to be formed on an ad hoc basis. In this 
scenario, the main competition was not to be seen in the military field, but instead in economics 
and technology, with the EU struggling for supremacy with the US and Japan in these fields. 
This struggle was to act as a key facilitator of closer European integration. Russia and China 
were seen as developing great powers that in time might develop into competitors in the 
economic and technological fields. In the short term, Russia was seen as moving in into one of 
two directions; either as a weak or cooperative country, which would mean that regionally the 
EU is in the driving seat or as a regional competitor with the EU leading to regional bipolarity. 
However, the authors argued that the most likely scenario was that Russia would try to maintain 
a sphere of influence in its near abroad, while still avoiding a complete break with the US and 
the EU, meaning that there could be cooperation in some areas but not in others. The 
commission nicknamed such a development “Cold Peace”. Institutionally, NATO would be 
weakened by these developments, as competition between the Western allies would mean that 
the organisation loses its political importance. As such, defending Europe will become a more 
European matter, leading to an upgrade of the EU’s defence cooperation (ibid; 70-71). 
 
The third, and most unlikely, scenario was a return to the European system from before the Cold 
War of shifting alliances and sub-regional conflicts. In this scenario, the commission did not 
think that wars would break out between the European great powers, but it was found likely that 
there would be increased competition and likely involvement in conflicts in the near-abroad for 
the national benefit of the involved states (ibid; 71).  
 
In relation to the security consequences that these three scenarios could have for Denmark, the 
commission devoted little effort on the third one because it was so highly unlikely. Instead, the 
focus was on the first two ones and their implications, which mainly were that in both cases, 
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direct, conventional security for Denmark was seen likely to be substantially higher than it had 
been for centuries. To the commission, this meant that Denmark, because it was no longer 
weighed down by grave security issues, had the opportunity to choose how much it would like to 
be involved in the international system. Thus, based on the developments in the international 
system between the end of the Cold War and the publishing of the report, the Defence 
Commission recommended that Danish security policy should be based on scenario 1, taking 
into account the possibility of scenario 2, while still being aware of that scenario 3 (ibid; 74).  
 
In relation to the described scenarios, the Commission recommended that some changes were to 
be made in relation to the purpose and tasks of the Danish military. Since the end of the Cold 
War had meant that the Soviet Union and its allies were no longer considered a major threat to 
Denmark, the purpose and tasks of the armed forces had already been changed by law in 1993, 
so that the specific purpose no longer was to defeat the Eastern Bloc militarily alongside 
Denmark’s NATO allies. Instead, the new focus was on the prevention of conflict, albeit still 
with a focus on NATO as an integral part of Danish security and defence policy (ibid; 107). 
However, the commission argued that this should be changed into five overall goals, namely 
maintaining Danish sovereignty, crisis-management and collective defence tasks, promoting 
stability and trust, especially in relation to countries in the former Eastern Bloc, peace-supporting 
missions, and what was coined as “other missions” (ibid; 120-121). No doubt, these 
recommendations were influenced by Denmark’s participation in the operations in the Balkans, 
especially as peace keeping operations had become “the talk of the town” because of this 
participation.  
 
4.4 Desert Fox and Allied Force 
 
While peace keeping operations were on everyone’s lips, Denmark would not only become 
involved in such operations in the Balkan’s during the 1990’s, as the next major operation with 
Danish involvement was Operation Desert Fox in 1998, which sought to punish Iraq’s Saddam 
Hussein for not living up to the UN sanctioned UNSCOM weapons inspection mission set up 
following the 1991-1992 Gulf War. The operation was set into motion by Great Britain and the 
United States without a sanctioning from the UN Security Council, and led to a four-day 
bombing campaign against Iraq. The Danish commitment to the mission was the symbolic 
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deployment of a C130 Hercules transport plane as support, which would end up not being used 
in the operation. This deployment received backing in parliament from the Danish Social-Liberal 
Party, which had traditionally been in opposition to the use of military force (Friis 2008; 347-
348). 
 
Denmark took a relatively more prominent part in Operation Allied Force against Serbia in 
1998-1999. In Kosovo, Kosovo-Albanians were revolting against the government of Serbian 
President Slobodan Milosevic, who tried to crush the uprising. This led to streams of refugees 
and TV-images of people in distress and to a condemnation of the situation and Milosevic’s 
handling of it from the UN. However, no action against Serbia was sanctioned by the Security 
Council, which eventually led to a NATO-led coalition of the willing striking targets in Serbia 
and Kosovo from the air. Legally, the operation was called a humanitarian intervention, and 
Denmark would take part by deploying a total of eight F16 fighter-bombers to Italy. The Danish 
planes would come to fly offensive bombing sorties, and the participation would mark the first 
time that a Danish F-16 dropped a bomb in anger. The NATO bombings meant that the Kosovo-
Albanian rebels could mount an offensive on the ground, a strategy that would later be repeated 
in Libya. By June 1999, the NATO bombings had forced the Serb forces out of Kosovo, and the 
Security Council sanctioned a peace keeping force led by NATO to be sent in. Denmark would 
participate in this force, KFOR, by deploying 850 soldiers to Mitrovica in northern Kosovo (Friis 
2008; 348-350). As of October 2011, 35 Danes are still taking part in KFOR (fmn.dk – Kosovo).  
 
4.5 Into a new millennium 
 
At the turn of the millennium, Danish activist foreign policy had been exemplified by the cases 
shown above. Internationally, the United States was acting as a sort of “International Policeman” 
taking the lead in military operations against rogue states around the world. That the US was the 
leading great power in the international system had been shown time and again by the US-led 
interventions around the world. From an US standpoint, the UN Security Council had been 
highlighted as an ineffective institution through various Russian and Chinese vetoes, and thus the 
US-led coalitions of willing participants had intervened in Iraq and Kosovo without sanctioning 
from the Council. For Denmark, the 1990’s and the new security environment had led to several 
developments, most notably the absence of traditional threats to Danish sovereignty and 
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territorial integrity and the new activist foreign policy, in which military engagements and 
outright war against other countries had been accepted. Moving towards a new milestone in 
Danish foreign- and security police, the trends had been set. 
 
4.6 The 2000-2004 Defence Agreement 
 
The 2000-2004 Defence Agreement was based on the 1997 Defence Commission’s report, and it 
sought to implement the suggestions that the Commission had come up with. This would lead to 
further cuts and a restructuring of the Danish defence based on the recommendations of the 
report. The new defence agreement underlined that the international environment had changed 
profoundly since the end of the Cold War, and that this new environment could enable changes 
in the Danish armed forces. The most clear indication was that the agreement was based on the 
1997 Commission’s conclusion of the absence of a clear and defined threat for the coming 10-15 
years, which meant that the parliament could decide on reducing the capacity of the Danish 
armed forces to defend Danish territory, while still maintaining potent and credible contribution 
to NATO in case it was needed. This meant that focal point of the Danish defence would change 
from a mobilization force to rapid reaction forces capable of crisis management. Most 
importantly, the capacity to engage in international operations was to be improved. On top of 
this, there was to be a focus on mobility, and as such, investments in new equipment would have 
to be increased (fmn.dk – Tidligere forsvarsforlig).  
 
To enable the implementation of these goals, much of the structure of the Danish armed forces 
would have to changed or removed entirely. For instance, the army would be cut to a fighting 
force of approximately 46,000 soldiers and the last of the Cold War-era WILLEMOES-class 
missile boats would be decommissioned, along with moving several military departments 
elsewhere geographically and selling off barracks and buildings no longer needed because of 
these changes. The reduction and restructuring would in turn mean that processes could be made 
more cost effective and that several support structures could be minimized or cut away entirely, 
making funds available to buy new equipment and enabling the shift in focus to mobility and 
international operations without increasing the defence budget considerably. Among the new 
equipment to be purchased were helicopters and armoured fighting vehicles for the army, two 
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large support ships for the navy, and transport aircraft and air-to-ground missiles for the air force 
(fmn.dk – Tidligere forsvarsforlig).  
 
4.7 9/11 and beyond 
 
4.8.1 September 11 and Afghanistan 
 
While the 2000 – 2004 Defence Agreement had sought to implement the suggestions of the 1997 
Defence Commission’s report, it was arguably world events that would come to shape Danish 
security and defence policy in the early 21st century. On September 11, 2001, two passenger jets 
crashed into World Trade Center in New York, a third into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., 
and a fourth into a field in Pennsylvania. As the terrorist attacks on the US unfolded, the Danish 
government and then Danish Prime-Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen was clear in the repulsion 
of the attacks, by stating that the attacks on the US was an attack on Denmark as well (Rynning 
2009; 135). Nyrup Rasmussen expressed his deepest sympathies with the victims and their 
families on the 11th, but on the 22nd of September he expressed his explicit support to the US by 
stating that “We are standing shoulder to shoulder with the US. And we will follow you all the 
way. […] Tell us what you want” (Kaae & Nissen 2008; 10, author’s translation). This position 
was eventually also taken up by the government of Anders Fogh Rasmussen taking over in the 
fall of 2001.  
 
Connecting the terrorists who had committed the September 11 attacks with Osama bin Laden 
and the al-Qaeda network took only one day for the US intelligence services, and Western 
military involvement in Afghanistan in relation to the attacks in New York began in earnest on 
October 7, 2001. Preceding the attacks, the US had tried to make the Taliban regime hand over 
Osama bin Laden to the US for prosecution, but the regime and its leader Mullah Omar declined 
(Tanner 2009; 291-295). The initial conflict on the ground was easily won by the US and its 
allies on the ground in Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance. By the time the US-led attacks began, 
Afghanistan had been more or less undergoing a civil war since at least the 1970’s, and as a 
result, all visible military targets were soon demolished, and the fragility of the Taliban-regime 
exposed. As it would be the case some ten years later in Libya, United States and NATO aircraft 
soon became the de-facto air force of the Northern Alliance. Danish involvement in the conflict, 
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besides the vocal support given by Nyrup Rasmussen, would come in form of a flight of four F-
16 fighter-bombers, a C-130 Hercules transport aircraft, and special-forces soldiers, with the first 
102 arriving in early January 2002 (Friis 2008; 370). The special-forces soldiers would take part 
in Operation Anaconda in early March 2002, as part of Task Force K-Bar, with the objective of 
decimating the Taliban in the valleys of south-eastern Afghanistan, on the border with Pakistan 
(Tanner 2009; 315; Soldaterne fra Task Force K-Bar).  
 
Besides the early engagements, the Danish parliament decided that Denmark should take part in 
the rebuilding of Afghanistan and the anticipated stabilization force (Friis 2008; 370). This UN-
sanctioned stabilization force, known as ISAF, would become the mainstay of the Danish 
commitment to Afghanistan, and the first Danish soldiers taking part in ISAF would be the 
approximately one hundred deployed to the Feyzabad-region in northern Afghanistan in 2004. 
However, the real test began in 2006, as ISAF took over handling security responsibilities in the 
more unstable southern part of the country, and Danish soldiers were sent to the Helmand-
province, with 400 initially deployed (Dueholm 2010; 7, Friis 2008; 370).  
 
The early Danish involvement in Afghanistan was symbolized by many of the same 
characteristics that had shaped the operations of the 1990’s, most notably wide international and 
domestic support, especially in because the US had called its allies in NATO to assist on the 
grounds of invoking Article 5 in the Washington Treaty for the first time in the alliance’s history. 
However, it was the involvement in Iraq that would inform most of the talk and debate about 
Danish involvement in international affairs during the “00’s”.   
 
4.8.2 Iraq 
 
The lead-up to the conflict in Iraq really began to take shape as a result of the remarks that US 
President George W. Bush made in his 2002 state of the union address on 29 January of that 
year. In his speech, Bush introduced the notion of an “Axis of Evil” between rogue leaders in 
more or less corrupt states and international terrorism. As written above, four-and-a-half months 
before, terrorists had guided passenger jets into the symbols of American power, the World 
Trade Center towers in New York and the Pentagon, home of the US Department of Defense, in 
Washington, D.C. One of the states that Bush identified as being a member of the Axis of Evil 
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was Iraq, and he would later come to identify Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein as an enemy of 
the free world (Kaae & Nissen 2008; 14-15).  
 
As 2002 progressed and war seemed more and more inevitable, the US sent a request for which 
types of military equipment that Denmark could provide to the Danish Ministry of Defence on 
15 November 2002. This led to a short-list of what the Danish military would be able to provide 
being presented in the foreign policy committee of the Danish parliament on 20 November 2002. 
The list included a corvette-sized warship, a submarine, a detachment from the Danish special 
forces, medical personnel, logistics units, and F-16 fighter bombers (Kaae & Nissen 2008; 103, 
105). Eventually, not least due to strong disagreement between the government and opposition 
parties in parliament, the Danish commitment to the operation would end up consisting of the 
submarine SÆLEN, the corvette OLFERT FISCHER, a three-man team of medical personnel, 
and a smaller number of liaison officers (Kaae & Nissen 2008; 151, 246). On March 21, 2003, 
the Danish parliament agreed on supporting the US-led coalition of the willing that had attacked 
Iraq in the early morning hours of the day before (Kaae & Nissen 2008; 248).  
 
While the build-up and lead-up to this conflict will probably continue to be discussed for several 
more years as the most clear indication of the “Bush doctrine”, and the impact of the so-called 
neoconservatives on US foreign policy, the reasons for Danish involvement have also been 
discussed intensely, such as in the study by Anders Henriksen & Jens Ringsmose (2011). The 
decision to send Danish military personnel has since been criticised for the fact that it built on 
only the smallest possible margin in relation to the support from the Danish parliament, as it was 
voted through with support of only 61 votes compared to 50 against, with 111 MP’s participating 
in the voting on 21 March 2003 (Kaae & Nissen 2008; 244). However, the decision was 
followed up on 15 May 2003 with a parliamentary decision to deploy a battalion of soldiers to 
southern Iraq. The battalion was to be put under British command. This decision received wider 
support in parliament, especially as there was now a mandate from the UN Security Council 
allowing an international coalition to provide assistance with rebuilding efforts and managing 
security in Iraq in the form of Security Council Resolution 1483 (Den Store Danske – Irakkrigen, 
Kaae & Nissen 2008; 246, UN Press Release SC/7765). The Danish battalion would remain in 
Iraq until August 2007, with a smaller contingent consisting of four helicopters and 55 support 
personnel remaining until the end of 2007. According to the Danish Ministry of Defence, as of 
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September 2011, eight Danes are officially posted in Iraq as part of the NATO training mission 
NTM-I and the UN’s UNAMI mission (fnm.dk – Indsatsen i Irak). In total, between 5,500 and 
6,000 Danes has taken part in operations in Iraq, with nine fatalities (Kaae & Nissen 2008; 247, 
Den Store Danske – Irakkrigen).      
 
4.9 The 2005-2009 Defence Agreement 
 
The 2005-2009 Defence Agreement was in essence a continuation of what was set in motion 
during as a result of the 2000 – 2004 agreement. This was especially so in the sense that all 
conventional military threats were seen to have disappeared for the foreseeable future, and as 
such there was no longer a need for a defence force that could be mobilized to face a threat. 
However, the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 had meant that international terrorism, one 
of the asymmetrical threats outlined in the 1997 Defence Commissions’ report, had become the 
main security focus for the Danish parliament and government, along the lines of most other 
Western governments. Also, as shown above, by the time that this agreement came into 
existence, Denmark had also participated in the US-led invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Furthermore, Danish soldiers had been deployed in both countries in order to participate in the 
stabilization operations taking place there. This was reflected in the defence agreement’s text, 
which before all else underlined that the armed forces could and were to play a vital part of an 
activist Danish foreign policy. In the agreement, the purpose of the Danish armed forces was 
outlined as three-fold. First to prevent direct and indirect threats to the security of Denmark and 
its allies; second to maintain Danish sovereignty and to protect Danish civilians; third to 
contribute to international peace and security along the lines of the United Nations Pact. To 
achieve these goals, the two underlying factors in the new agreement were to increase the 
capability to deploy forces internationally and to prevent terrorist acts and their effects (Defence 
Agreement 2005 – 2009; 1-2).  
 
Structurally, the armed forces were to be organized in a manner that reflected the new 
international focus outlined in the agreement. This meant that the Cold War-style mobilized 
defence was to give way to a more streamlined total defence approach, with a focus on rapid 
reaction forces trained and armed for international deployments. An important consequence of 
this was that conscription was changed markedly by cutting the conscription period to four 
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months for all but the most specialized branches of the armed forces, for instance soldiers and 
sailors for the Royal Guard and the DANNEBROG royal yacht. Instead of training soldiers, the 
new training for conscripts would turn them into “total defence persons”. Soldiers for the rapid 
reaction forces were to undergo a more rigorous and traditional military education (Defence 
Agreement 2005 – 2009). 
 
The new structure also meant that the various branches of the armed forces were to be 
streamlined for international operations, a process begun in the earlier five-year agreement. For 
the army, this meant consolidating and restructuring of forces into two brigades, one remaining 
in Denmark and one destined for international deployments. The agreement called for the army 
to be able to continually deploy 1,500 soldiers on international operations, out of a total 
anticipated deployment of 2,000 Danish soldiers, sailors, and airmen. New procurements 
included infantry fighting vehicles, wheeled armoured vehicles, and equipment for the Army’s 
special forces, whose number was to rise to 135 (Defence Agreement 2005 – 2009; 8). For the 
navy the most important change was the decommissioning of the submarine force. Furthermore, 
the navy was restructured into two squadrons, with one being specifically set up for international 
deployments. The most important new procurements were three destroyer-sized patrol ships with 
a strong sensor and electronics suite, as well as missile launchers capable of firing missiles 
against land, sea, and air targets (Defence Agreement 2005 – 2009; 9-10). The air force saw the 
decommissioning of the DeHawk air defence missile system, and a restructuring of forces along 
the lines of the army and navy (ibid; 12). 
 
4.10 The Defence Commission of 2008 
 
In the eleven years that had passed between the publishing of the last defence commission’s 
report in 1997 and report of 2008, much had changed in international politics. This was 
acknowledged in the report’s scenarios for developments in the international system, as they 
were all based on the effects of globalization on the international distribution of power, risks, and 
threats. In the report, conventional military threats were seen to have by and large given way to 
asymmetric threats such as international terrorism, failed states, and the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction. However, it was also acknowledged that the most important threats to 
Danish sovereignty, security, and interests were bound to come from variations in the 
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distribution of power in the international system and the developments in this distribution in the 
years leading to 2025. The commission concluded that the United States will still be the only 
superpower in 2025, especially because it is seen as the only state with a true global military 
capability. However, other actors such as the EU, China, India, and Russia are believed to have 
developed into centres of power in the same timeframe, challenging US superiority in several 
areas, especially in the military and economic dimensions (Final report – Defence Commission 
of 2008; 61). 
 
On the basis of these developments, the commission concludes that Denmark will not be 
confronted by direct and conventional, nor strategic, threats in the foreseeable future. Instead, 
threats and risks to Denmark’s security are seen as asymmetrical transnational threats coming 
from non-state actors. Because the threats are becoming transnational, international and 
multilateral solutions are required to handle them. The possibility for insecurity and conflict in 
this respect lies in whether or not the various power centres can come to agreements in relation 
to which threats are actually threats, and subsequently, how to handle these threats. As a result, 
the developments in the distribution of power will have profound effects on where and how 
military means will be utilized to counter threats and risks (Final report – Defence Commission 
of 2008; 60).    
 
The three scenarios highlighted by the commission as possible developments in global politics 
towards 2025 are based on these assumptions. Just as it has been the case in the previous defence 
commissions’ reports though, none of these scenarios were seen as coming into effect in their 
complete form. In the first scenario, the rising powers adapt successfully into the present US-led 
rules-based international order, and as such, the legitimization of international interventions will 
be sought in the United Nations Security Council. The second scenario is based on a more 
distinct distribution of power between the various power centres, which means that international 
operations will rarely be based on universal agreements. As a result, the international system will 
be marked by competition and conflict between the power centres.  The third scenario foresees 
an international order marked by the absence of clear leadership, and thus without a clear 
distribution of power. This means that it is hard for the great powers and states in the system to 
exert influence over one another, which in turn means that non-state actors will gain increased 
influence, leading to chaos and insecurity especially in relation to international norms, rules, and 
Page 54 
 
regulations. Because it will be hard to come to agreements in relation to international 
interventions, multilateral actions will be few and far between. The commission argue that 
scenario 1 would be in Denmark’s best interest as it ensures that the global order is maintained, 
meaning that it is decisions from the UN Security Council that legitimizes international 
interventions. The first scenario can also enable the EU to gain more influence in the 
international system as only the EU seeks multilateral solutions to international problems in 
contrast to the other major actors who favours both unilateral and multilateral actions. 
Furthermore, a stronger EU could mean that the US would be more cooperative vis-à-vis 
multilateral actions instead of unilateral ones. For these reasons, the commission endorses that 
Danish security and defence policy is designed, implemented, and executed in a manner making 
scenario 1 possible (ibid; 62-63). 
 
Because of the developments in global politics since the publishing of the last report in 1997, the 
new defence commission argued that the focus of Danish security and defence policy had 
changed from a passive defence of territory to action against the threats posed by the new 
asymmetric threats and factors that destabilize the international order. While the end of the Cold 
War had meant that the traditional, strategic threats had disappeared, and that this had ensured a 
security environment with more room for manoeuvre for Denmark, the forces of globalization 
had resulted in a “[…] far more diffuse, complex, and unforeseeable environment, where 
international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and failed states represent 
the primary threats to Danish security” (ibid; 72, author’s translation). This meant that the 
handling of security issues, for a large part, would come to take place far from Danish territory, 
and that this in turn will come to represent the involvement and deployment of Danish armed 
forces abroad. However, maintaining Danish sovereignty will continue to be a job for the Danish 
military, although the commission sees the traditional exercise of maintaining sovereignty as 
becoming merged with exercising authority on Danish territory, i.e. more of a policing task. The 
commission argued that this is especially so because of the lack of a traditional threat and the 
negative implications of globalization. Examples of the tasks associated with maintaining Danish 
sovereignty and exercising authority include monitoring fishing and rescue at sea (ibid; 73, 98).  
 
The developments in international politics on which the commission’s report is based, also 
meant that the authors saw a need for change in the purpose and tasks of the Danish armed 
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forces. These had last been changed in 2001, but the 2008 commission argued that there was a 
necessity to change the law regarding the Danish armed forces again in order to better reflect that 
the main task of the Danish military is to defend Denmark, but that this is now taking place 
farther from Danish shores (ibid; 113). According to the commission, the purpose of the Danish 
military should be to maintain the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Denmark, including Greenland 
and the Faroe Islands, thereby ensuring the continued existence and territorial integrity of the 
country. That fulfilling this purpose requires the armed forces to be deployed farther from home 
is exemplified by the fact that the second paragraph of these suggested changes specifically 
states that the armed forces must be able to contribute to international operations militarily (ibid; 
114).  
 
4.11 The 2010 – 2014 Defence Agreement 
 
The latest and present defence agreement takes into account most of the recommendations of the 
2008 Defence Commission. It is noted that the basic purpose of the armed forces of Denmark is 
to maintain the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Denmark and to secure the continued existence 
and integrity of the country. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that the Danish military has 
become a cornerstone of Danish activist foreign and security policy. Coupled with an absence of 
a clearly defined conventional threat, this means that the Danish military is currently undergoing 
a transformation process from a conventional mobilized defence to a modern deployable fighting 
force, capable of being deployed essentially anywhere in the world, in order to fulfil its task and 
purpose. NATO continues in being a cornerstone in Danish security and defence policy, not least 
because of the principle of collective defence as stated in Article 5, but also because NATO can 
form the framework for international military operations with Danish participation. The UN is 
still considered vital for Denmark, especially in its capacity as a legitimizer of international 
operations and norms of behaviour. Finally, it is assumed that there will continue to be a demand 
for Danish participation in international interventions in the future, requiring the continuation of 
the transformation process (Defence Agreement 2010 – 2014; 1-4).  
 
The international scope envisaged for the Danish military in both former defence agreements and 
in the 2008 Defence Commission’s final report is also implemented in the agreement. As in the 
previous agreement, the goal is to be able to continually deploy 2,000 troops, or a number of 
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other units equivalent to 2,000 servicemen, in international operations anywhere in the world. 
This means that the restructuring undertaken in previous defence agreements is to be 
consolidated. For the army, this means that the operative structure is to be reorganized around 
the concept of the battalion sized battle group, a fighting force of 300 to 800 soldiers with 
relevant support units attached as required for a given mission. Two such battle groups are to be 
deployed continually. For the navy, new helicopters are to be procured, and these must be able to 
support international operations as well as the more traditional operations in the North Atlantic, 
operating from navy ships in both cases. The air force’s support structure is to be adjusted in a 
manner that facilitates an increased ability to deploy military and transport aircraft 
internationally. Furthermore, a unit of EH-101 transport helicopters capable of international 
deployments is to be established along with the relevant support structure (ibid; 6-8). 
 
4.12 Current operations 
 
Of the operations that Denmark is currently taking part in, the ISAF operation in Afghanistan is 
by far the most influential and important. In August 2007, the last Danish soldiers withdrew from 
Iraq, meaning that more forces were available for deployment in Afghanistan, and in October 
2007, the Danish parliament agreed to increase the Danish contingent in Helmand to about 550 
soldiers accompanied by Leopard 2 tanks for support. The Danish soldiers are part of the British-
led Task Force Helmand, in which soldiers from Great Britain, USA, Estonia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and Togo also take part. As of September 2011, Denmark has 750 soldiers and 
support personnel deployed in Afghanistan, with about 600 soldiers involved directly in the 
unstable Helmand province as part of the Danish battle-group (HOK – Om ISAF). Fighting in 
Helmand has been tough on the Danish forces, and as of the time this writing, 42 Danish soldiers 
have lost their lives in relation to the conflict, with Improvised Explosive Devices, IEDs, taking 
the biggest toll (Politiken.dk – Danske soldater døde i Afghanistan). Denmark has thus become 
the contributing nation with the highest number of fatalities per capita in relation to the fighting 
in Afghanistan. On top of this figure comes a long list of injured soldiers and soldiers suffering 
from PTSD.  
 
Besides the involvement in Afghanistan, the most recent example of the activist Danish foreign 
and security policy was the engagement in Libya, where the Danish parliament agreed on 19 
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March, 2011 to deploy F-16 fighter-bombers to Sigonella Naval Air Station in Sicily. The 
background for this decision was the United Nations Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) 
which called for the enforcement of a no-fly zone over Libya to secure the civilian population 
against threats from the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. During the two NATO-led missions that 
the Security Council resolution made possible, Operation Odyssey Dawn and Operation Unified 
Protector, Danish planes conducted 600 sorties and dropped 923 bombs of various kinds 
according to the Danish Ministry of Defence, meaning that Danish aircraft were responsible for 
destroying more than 15 % of the 6,000 military targets struck according to NATO (DMoD – 
Danish effort in Libya; 2011, NATO.int – NATO and Libya). The operation was a complete 
success from a military viewpoint as Gaddafi’s means with which to threaten the civilian 
population were destroyed. From another perspective though, it also enabled the Libyan rebels to 
mount an assault against the forces loyal to Gaddafi. In effect, the NATO planes became the very 
potent air force of the Libyan rebels, who highly likely would not have stood a chance against 
Gaddafi’s forces if there had not been an intervention. NATO proved a very valuable 
organisation and tool in this mission, and the Danish planes were an integral part of the mission. 
Denmark is also actively engaged in the ongoing NATO-led anti-piracy campaign, Operation 
Ocean Shield, in the Gulf of Aden. Currently, the Danish warship ABSALON is deployed as the 
Danish commitment to this mission (fmn.dk – Pirateri).  
 
4.13 Budgetary developments 
 
Besides the political developments and developments in both operations and security 
environment shown above, it is important to outline another important part of a state’s security 
and defence policy, namely the defence budget. Modern militaries do not come far without 
funding, and as such it is crucial to be aware of how much money is allocated. NATO protocol 
stipulates that member states ought to devote a minimum of 2 % of GDP to the defence budget. 
During the 1980’s, Denmark devoted 2.1 %, with the figure falling to 2 % in 1994, and finally to 
1.7 % in 1996 (Final report – Defence Commission of 1997; 137). For the 1995 – 1999 Defence 
Agreement this meant that 15.8 billion DKK, in 1996 prices, was devoted to the armed forces per 
annum during the five year period. In the following 2000 – 2004 agreement, the budget was set 
at around 16.8 billion DKK, in 1999 prices (fmn.dk – Tidligere forsvarsforlig). In the 2005 – 
2009 agreement this rose from an allocated 18.6 billion DKK in 2005, in 2004 prices, to 19.1 
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billion in 2009 (Defence Agreement 2005 – 2009; 20). In the current 2010 – 2014 budget, this 
has risen to 21 billion DKK in 2010 prices. On top of this comes an additional allocation in 
relation to the deployment in Afghanistan of 1.2 billion DKK due to unforeseen expenditures in 
relation to faster than anticipated deterioration of equipment and increased outlays to air 
transport, leaving the total defence budget around 22.2 billion DKK (Development in the Danish 
defence budget, Defence Agreement 2010 – 2014; 26).  
 
While this might seem like a drastic rise of 6 billon DKK, or roughly a 33 % rise since 1996, it is 
important to factor in the effects of inflation. Using Statistics Denmark’s figures for inflation in 
Denmark since 1996 (dst.dk – Inflation), it is evident that the 15.8 billion DKK in 1996 prices 
translates to 21.24 billion DKK by 20102, which is roughly similar to the defence expenditure in 
the 2010 – 2014 Defence Agreement. In 2010, the percentage of GDP devoted to the defence 
budget today was roughly 1.2 %, based on Denmark’s 2010 GDP (dst.dk – Nationalregnskab)3. 
As such, Denmark is not living up to NATO’s recommendations, but neither are most NATO 
countries, as shown in the 2008 Defence Commission’s report, exemplified by Canada devoting 
1.29 % and Holland 1.46 %, compared to Denmark’s 1.3 % in relation to GDP in 2007. The 
average defence expenditure in NATO is 1.5 % (Final report – Defence Commission of 2008; 
140). The development in the Danish defence budget is exemplified in the table on the next page. 
The table also shows which the parties in parliament voted in favour of a given Defence 
Agreement since 1988. 
  
                                                 
2
 Formula: (amount * new index) / old index = new amount. See dst.dk – Forbrugerprisindex for more information.  
3
 Formula: GDP / defence budget * 100 = percentage 
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Year ->  1988 1992 1995 2000 2005 2009 2012 
Budget (in 
billion 
DKK) 
11,9 
(in 
1984 
prices) 
15,8 
(in 
1992 
prices) 
15,8 
(in 
1996 
prices) 
16,7 
(in 
1999 
prices) 
18,6 
(in 
2004 
prices) 
19,1 (in 
2004 
prices) 
22,2 (in 
2010 
prices) 
Budget in 
2011 
prices (in 
billion 
DKK)4 
19,9 23,49 21,82 21,62 21,62 22,2 22,81 
Budget in 
constant 
2010 US$ 
(million)5 
4,519 4,408 4,263 4,210 4,108 4,230 4,515 
(in 
2011) 
As 
percentage 
of GDP6 
2,1 1,9 1,7 1,5 1,3 1,4 1,5 (in 
2010) 
Parties 
involved in 
agreement7 
C, V, 
Q, D, 
A 
(1985 
– 
1988) 
A, B, 
C, V, 
Q 
(1989 
– 
1992) 
A, B, 
C, D 
(1995 
– 
1999) 
A, B, 
C, D, 
V, Q 
(2000 
– 
2004) 
V, C, 
A, O, 
B, K 
(2005 
– 
2009) 
Same 
agreement 
as 2005 
V, A, O, 
F, C, B, 
I (2010 – 
2014) 
 
As the above table shows, the Danish defence budget has remained relatively stable since 1988, 
with an anomaly in 2011 prices in 1992 due to the lack of price level stated in the source material 
(Volden 2007; 78). This is underlined by the independent figures in constant 2010 US$ from 
                                                 
4
 See footnote #2 for formula. Inflation figures based on reference: dst.dk - Inflation 
5
 SIPRI.org – The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database - Denmark 
6
 SIPRI.org – The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database - Denmark 
7
 Partyletter: A = Social Democrats, B = Social-Liberal Party, C = Conservatives, D = Centre Democrats, F = 
Socialist People’s Party, I = Liberal Alliance, K or Q = Christian Democrats, O = Danish People’s Party, V = 
Danish Liberal Party. Sources: Volden 2007; Retsinformation.dk – Nr LSF 44; Defence Agreement 1995 – 1999, 
Defence Agreement 2000 – 2004; Defence Agreement 2005 – 2009, Defence Agreement 2010 – 2014. 
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SIPRI. Also the table shows that the defence expenditure has remained relatively stable since the 
end of the Cold War when measured in terms of percentage of GDP, varying between 1,9 % in 
1992, where much of the Cold War structure still remained and 1,3 % in 2005 where the search 
for improved efficiency was beginning to come to effect, and averaging at 1,55 % between 1992 
and 2010. Also, the table shows that the various Defence Agreements have generally been 
passed with wide support in parliament, indicating that both the five-year planning model and the 
content of the Defence Agreements is something that the politicians have been able to agree 
upon to a wide extent.  
 
4.14 Summary 
 
As exemplified above, Denmark has undertaken an activist security and defence policy since the 
end of the Cold War. It has been shown that the recommendations of the three defence 
commission reports has to a large extent been followed and implemented in subsequent defence 
agreements. Furthermore, it has been shown that these developments have aided the Danish 
armed forces in the participation in international military operations. In the next chapter, the 
developments shown above will be analysed and discussed in relation to the adaptation and 
activism thesis and Morgenthau’s classic realism to show why Denmark has participated in these 
operations despite the absence of clear and defined threats to Danish security.  
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5.0 Adaptation in security and defence policy? 
 
The above paragraphs summarize both the developments in and implementation of Danish 
security and defence policy in the past 20 – 25 years well. It has been shown that Denmark has 
participated actively in many military operations, characterised mainly by the fact that these 
represent a broad spectrum of the operations a country can become involved in the modern 
world. Furthermore, is shown that the various defence commissions have had a clear impact on 
the various five-year defence agreements passed by parliament in this period. Of course, the 
commission reports vary in their assumptions and conclusions, and therefore this chapter will 
analyse and discuss the developments shown above in relation to two questions, namely if it can 
be identified if there has been a continuity in Danish security and defence policy since the end of 
the Cold War, and secondly if such a continuity, if it exists, can be explained via Due-Nielsen 
and Petersen’s adaptation and activism thesis.  
 
5.1 Comparison and analysis 
 
From the outset, the 1988 report is atypical in relation to the later reports in the sense that its 
focus is on the Cold War continuing in some form during the 1990’s. It foresees the Soviet 
Union’s continued existence as well, and its scenarios are based on these conclusions. For 
Denmark and Danish security and defence policy, this means that there has to be a focus on 
fighting conventional conflict along with NATO allies, especially West Germany, against the 
forces of the Warsaw Pact. Procurement wise this leads to a proposition of acquiring materiel 
designed for large scale conventional conflict, such as tracked multiple-rocket launchers and 
anti-ship missiles. In other words, most of the report’s conclusions became irrelevant only a very 
short time after its publication, except for maybe for scenario of the dissolution of the Warsaw 
Pact, and thus backing for Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Such an event could, 
according to the report, have severe impacts on nationalist, ideological, and religious differences 
in the states of the region. Of course, the members of the commission had not foreseen the 
horrors of the Balkans in the 1990’s, but this scenario actually represented quite a good foresight 
of events to come. However, the commission did not foresee the involvement that Denmark 
would come to have in this ethnical and religious conflict. As a result, the report itself offers 
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little relevance for the policies of the 1990’s, and its scenarios and conclusions offer little 
relevance in relation to understanding the post-Cold War Danish security and defence policy.  
 
It does however represent a good example of Carsten Due-Nielsen and Nikolaj Petersen’s theory 
of adaptation and activism, in the sense that the matrix of influence capability and stress 
sensitivity can explain the views of the commission as well as the choices Danish politicians had 
to make in this period of the Cold War. As it is shown in the report, there was a fear of a Soviet 
attack on Denmark. According to the theory of Due-Nielsen and Petersen, Denmark thus had 
high stress sensitivity and low influence capability, explaining the need for a NATO 
commitment that was relevant to Denmark’s allies while still maintaining relatively good 
relations, or at least not being provocative, in regard to the Soviet Union. Being relevant to 
NATO meant the procurement described above, while maintaining a non-provocative stance 
meant that US military personnel or US bases were not allowed in Denmark.     
 
5.2 Activism in the 1990’s 
 
With the Cold War gone however, Danish stress sensitivity became very low, because the 
country was no longer a frontline state. As shown by developments since the end of the Cold 
War in the 1997 Defence Commission’s final report, initially the absence of strategic threat 
meant that the size of the armed forces was reduced across all three branches, and the general 
readiness level lowered. However, the end of the Cold War also signalled the beginning of 
Danish activism on the international stage. In a theoretical sense, Denmark now had the 
opportunity, or capability, to influence events in the world. This was exemplified by the 
symbolic deployment of a warship to the Persian Gulf in 1991-1992 in support of the UN-
sanctioned operation against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. However, a better example is probably the 
establishing of the Danish International Brigade in 1992. It was soldiers from this Brigade that 
was involved in the peace keeping missions in the Balkans in the 1990’s. Activism as part of 
Danish foreign policy, but also in security and defence policy, had thus been established.  
 
This was underlined further in the 1997 Defence Commission’s report, aptly named The Future 
Defence. Threats to Denmark were no longer strategic or territorial. The absence of threat, and 
thus a low degree of stress sensitivity, meant that there was now an opportunity for becoming 
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more involved in the international society. This had of course already been underlined by events 
of the early 1990’s, but the 1997 report ironed out any opposing views. Where the 1995 – 1999 
Defence Agreement had arguably kept the Danish military in a reduced Cold War state, for 
instance by only reducing the fighting strength to 58.000 from 72.000, seeking to acquire mobile 
rocket launched artillery, and upgrading the land based air defence system, the new report 
underlined that the threats Denmark now faced were not of the Cold War traditional type, or that 
at least, Denmark would not be faced with a conventional strategic threat for the conceivable 
future. And as such, there was a requirement for re-establishing both the purpose of the armed 
forces as well as re-structuring them for international deployment, rather than the territorial 
defence of the past. International activism had become reality by the time of the publishing of the 
1997 report. This was of course underlined by the Danish participation in the NATO bombings 
in Serbia and Kosovo in 1999, where UN Security Council sanctioning was not provided nor 
required for the parties of parliament to pass the vote of Danish participation.  
 
5.3 The 2000’s 
 
The 2000 – 2004 agreement meant that several establishments were to be closed or moved, and 
that unused buildings were to be sold off and the funds freed because of these actions were used 
to finance the procurement of weapons systems designed to be deployed internationally, such as 
transport helicopters and a transport aircraft, armoured fighting vehicles, support ships, and air to 
ground missiles. These events underlined the transformation of the Danish military into a leaner 
but meaner force usable as part of an activist foreign policy. However, it was the September 11, 
2001 events in the US that would come to underline the activist security and defence policy of 
Denmark. This was underlined not least by the statements given by then Social Democratic 
Prime-Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen and his successor Anders Fogh-Rasmussen of the Danish 
Liberal Party in relation to the Danish support for US and allied action in Afghanistan. 
 
This was of course highlighted further by the decision to take part, at least in principle, in the 
invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Following this decision, there has been much debate in 
Denmark, and arguably the World as such, whether or not this operation was an unprovoked act 
of aggression or a preventive strike against a determined foe. However, for Denmark it was 
arguably not as much the decision to actively do something that was the matter, as much as it 
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was the information and timing on which the decision was based. This was underlined by the 
decision in parliament in May 2003 to deploy a battalion of soldiers to Iraq under British 
command. As such, the Danish military involvement in Iraq arguably represents more of a 
continuation of the activist foreign and security policy already established in the 1990’s than a 
new starting point.  
 
The 2005 - 2009 agreement was very explicit in stating that the armed forces should play an 
integral role in activist Danish foreign and security policy. Denmark had at this point had been 
engaged in several international military operations, and was actively engaged in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, activist policy was really endorsed by parliament, underlined 
by the fact that all parties except for the Socialist People’s Party and the Red-Green Alliance 
(Enhedslisten) voted in favour of the new five year agreement. The focus on activism meant that 
further streamlining for international operations was needed in the armed forces. Most 
dramatically, this meant that the submarine force was disbanded altogether and that conscription 
was changed markedly to only last four months for almost all conscripts: Submarines built for 
operations in the shallow Baltic Sea are arguably not very useful in relation to global 
deployments, and soldiers that are going to be deployed far from home has to be well trained and 
equipped, meaning that a large standing force was unfeasible and simply not needed due to the 
Danish security environment. Along the lines of the previous agreement, the 2005 – 2009 
agreement’s procurement focus was on materiel suitable for international deployment, such as 
infantry fighting vehicles and three frigates. This agreement thus underlined the adaptation to the 
security environment undertaken after the Cold War by Denmark, again because the radically 
reduced stress sensitivity meant an increased influence capability.  
 
The 2008 Defence Commission concluded that no conventional threats were seen to be on the 
horizon for the foreseeable future, and at least until 2025. Denmark would thus able to adapt 
fully to the international environment in the sense that the threats posed according to the report 
were unconventional and asymmetric. According to the report, this had already happened as 
Denmark had changed its focus from a passive defence to an active engagement against these 
new threats. This underlines the adaptation and activism thesis, especially as the following 2010 
– 2014 defence agreement underlined that the Danish armed forces had become a cornerstone in 
the activist foreign and security policy. Arguably, this agreement also removed the last remnant 
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of the Cold War style military Denmark had until then, exemplified best by restructuring the 
army around the idea of the battalion battle group, and maintaining the target of 2,000 
continually deployed soldiers, or an equivalent, internationally.    
 
5.4 Discussion 
 
As the analysis above shows, there has been continuity in Danish security and defence policy 
since the Cold War. Activism has been the sought policy by all governments in this time period. 
The degree of activism in the sense of which operations Denmark has been engaged in have of 
course varied. Whereas Denmark had to find its feet in the beginning of the 1990’s exemplified 
by the symbolic deployment of OLFERT FISCHER to aid the UN allies in the 1991-1992 Gulf 
War, the deployment of peace keepers to the Balkans symbolized that Denmark was now willing 
to participate. This was of course outlined even further in the Danish participation in the NATO-
led bombings of Serbia in 1999, where there existed no UN sanctioning. The backing from 
parliament in this instance also underlines Denmark acting as a unitary actor, as the Social-
Liberal Party, which had traditionally been known as an anti-war party, voted in favour of this 
intervention. As such, viewing Denmark as a unitary actor in the international system is possible. 
This is important in relation to classic realism’s focus on states as the primary actors in 
international politics.  
 
In relation to the question of why there was and is a need for activism in security and defence 
policy, the above analysis shows that Denmark adapted to the setup of the international system 
following the end of the Cold War, as per Due-Nielsen and Petersen’s thesis. This did of course 
not happen overnight, but it is clear that the absence of threat, and thus low stress sensitivity, 
meant that Denmark could be become gradually more involved in international military 
operations. In Due-Nielsen and Petersen’s thesis, influence capability rises as stress sensitivity 
diminishes, which is arguably exactly what happened in Denmark’s case. Initially, the armed 
forces were only cut minimally from their Cold War standards. However, the capability to 
influence, and thus to be activist, rose by the development of the Danish International Brigade 
and various support units geared for international deployments. As the above clearly shows, 
there has been an on-going transformation of the Danish armed forces’ to become a leaner but 
meaner fighting force, capable of international deployments. Thus, the Danish military has 
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become a toolbox in which politicians can look for the right tool for a given security related job. 
This development took shape in earnest after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, as it was 
highlighted that even though the traditional threat had all but vanished, asymmetric threats 
persisted. As such, if Denmark wanted to continue on a path of activism, this meant that the 
armed forces had to be adapted to have capabilities to fight such threats. There was therefore no 
longer a need for submarines or an air defence system, systems that were both cut from the 
Danish capabilities list in the 00’s.  
 
Beyond the political developments, it is also worth remembering that the Danish defence budget 
has not risen or fallen dramatically since the end of the Cold War. This is indicated well in the 
table above, showing the development in the defence budget since 1988. As has been underlined 
time and again in the Defence Commissions’ reports, there has been a requirement in the Danish 
armed forces to reduce costs and make processes more efficient. As stated in the reports and in 
the Defence Agreements’, the key purpose of these measures has been to free up funds for 
international operations, and for procuring military hardware capable and useable in international 
military operations. If the traditional mobilized defence of the Cold War had been maintained, 
the defence budget would arguably had to have doubled in size, something that Danish 
politicians nor Danes arguably would have been willing to do. As such, the activist security and 
defence policy undertaken by Denmark since the end of the Cold War has clearly been a choice 
that politicians have been willing to take. In relation to adaptation and activism, Denmark has 
sought to increase its influence capability now that stress sensitivity was reduced drastically with 
the end of the Cold War. And if a state wants to influence international affairs it invariably 
requires an activist foreign, security, and defence policy.  
 
5.5 Summary 
 
Denmark is still a small power, but the lack of a territorial threat has meant that the military is no 
longer passively defending, but actively engaged in preventing threats, just as it was noted by the 
2008 Defence Commission and in the 2010 – 2014 Defence Agreement. Therefore the adaptation 
and activism thesis is good at explaining the developments. It is possible to follow such policies 
because Denmark’s stress sensitivity has become very low, due to the disappearance of 
traditional military threats. On the other hand, this has meant that there has been and is an 
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opportunity to influence international developments more, understood by Due-Nielsen and 
Petersen as influence capability. This capability has led to activism in security and defence 
policy, meaning that the Danish armed forces’ have been adapted to military deployments far 
from Danish shores. Furthermore, it can be established that Denmark has acted as a unitary actor 
in this time period, as parliament time and again, and generally with wide support, has passed 
decisions that has enabled Danish participation in international military operations. In the next 
chapter, I will discuss these findings in relation to classic realism in order to show why a small 
state as Denmark can benefit from pursuing an activist policy internationally in a world where 
competition is the order of the day.   
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6.0 Realist explanations for Danish activist security and defence policy 
 
In the above chapter it is shown that Denmark has participated in several international military 
operations since the end of the Cold War and that Denmark has thus followed a policy of 
activism in relation to security and defence policy. As shown by the adaptation and activism 
thesis, Denmark has experienced a decline in stress sensitivity since the end of the Cold War, 
and the country has therefore been able to influence world affairs to a larger degree, when 
compared with earlier times. While this is clearly the case, the question of Denmark has 
participated in the international military operations in relation to the absence of threats still 
remains. In this chapter, I will seek to answer it along the lines of Morgenthau’s classic realism.  
 
6.1 Gaining, maintaining, and demonstrating power 
 
In Morgenthau’s classic realism, states can seek to gain more power, maintain the power that 
they have, or seek to demonstrate that they have power. As shown above, a small state such as 
Denmark essentially seeks these things just as all other states do, but it is more vulnerable to 
what happens in the international system of states. According to the adaptation and activism 
thesis, a country with high stress sensitivity often has low influence capability. This was the case 
for Denmark during the Cold War. In this period, Denmark was locked into the conflict between 
East and West, with trigger happy politicians and generals present on both sides. Taking into 
account Morgenthau’s patterns of power as either direct opposition or competition, the struggle 
between the two superpowers of the Cold War meant that had Denmark stayed a neutral country, 
there would highly likely have been direct opposition or competition between East and West 
with regards to who could dominate Denmark. This is especially so due to geographical location 
of the country at the entrance to the Baltic Sea. Therefore it represented an important strategic 
area, underlined by the Warsaw Pact’s war plans, where the invasion of Denmark in case of war 
was of the utmost strategic importance (Friis 2008; 302). By joining NATO, Denmark showed 
its colours to the surrounding world, but as shown by Due-Nielsen and Henriksen, some 
acquiescence had to be shown in relation to the Soviet Union. This acquiescence was perhaps 
shown best by denying US soldiers and forward bases in Denmark proper. Entering the NATO 
constellation was therefore arguably the right thing for Denmark, as this was the best way to 
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maintain relative self-determination. As such, Denmark sought to maintain the power it had 
during the Cold War.  
 
After the Cold War, this changed profoundly. Initially, looking at Denmark’s actions it should 
have been expected that the armed forces would have been reduced considerably in the 1990’s 
due to the absence of threat. However, as Danish sovereignty and self-determination was no 
longer merely a function of the relationship of others, this did not happen. And when it 
happened, it did so because a different kind of military was sought altogether, namely a military 
geared for international deployments far from Danish territory. As specified directly for the first 
time in the 2004 – 2009 Defence Agreement, the Danish armed forces should and could play an 
integral part of an activist foreign, security, and defence policy. Of course, as shown above, by 
then the military had already been involved in several military operations internationally, and the 
wording in the agreement was arguably only codification of what was already the norm. In 
relation to classic realism, what has happened since the end of the Cold War can thus be best 
explained by looking as Denmark seeking to maintain, or perhaps even gain, relative power, and 
then afterwards seeking to demonstrate this power, in order to both be able to maintain self-
determination in the future, but also to demonstrate that the country is willing to what is 
necessary to maintain this self-determination.  
 
6.2 “Leaner but meaner” 
 
Therefore, while it might have seemed odd to restructure the armed forces, shrinking them in the 
1990’s, this can make sense in realist theory. If Denmark wanted to able to influence world 
affairs partly through an activist security and defence policy, thereby maintaining and 
demonstrating power, it first needed a military that was capable of international deployment, 
instead of a mobilized defence force, only partly capable of defending the country’s own 
territory. The first result of this was the establishment of the Danish International Brigade. The 
structural changes were also reflected in defence procurement, which shifted from being focused 
on equipment suited for large scale, high intensity warfare to equipment more useable for 
deployment in international operations. As such, even though the number of soldiers, sailors, and 
airmen decreased, the Danish military became more potent, especially so because equipment 
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better suited for the tasks at hand were procured. In other words, the restructuring meant that 
relative Danish power was consolidated, because the armed forces became “leaner but meaner”.  
 
As the restructuring went on, it also became important to demonstrate that Denmark was willing 
and able to take part in international military operations. In classic realism, the dogma is that one 
has to be willing to demonstrate the power that one possesses. In that sense, the deployment of a 
corvette to the Persian Gulf in 1991 was important in that in showed that there was a willingness 
to take part and deploy military force to pursue a political goal. The same was arguably the case 
in the Balkans, not least in relation to the deployment of a peace keeping force, but especially in 
Operation Allied Force, where Danish warplanes dropped bombs in anger for the first time. 
Furthermore, as established above, by the time of the terrorist attacks on the US on September 11 
2001, Denmark had already demonstrated a willingness to participate in international military 
operations. Even though the scope, not least in relation to the intensity of fighting, changed 
considerably with the participation in Iraq and Afghanistan, the overall goal did not. In both 
these cases, Denmark showed that it was willing to deploy military power to achieve its goals.  
 
6.3 Being able and willing matters 
 
Arguably, being willing to demonstrate power is both important in the negative sense, i.e. that 
realism sees states as competing with each other, and in the positive sense with regards to 
alliances. As the above paragraphs show, Denmark has been willing to first acquire capable 
military means and to deploy them when deemed necessary. However, because Denmark is a 
small power, it could benefit from entering alliances. As Morgenthau argues, alliances are only 
formed when the parties have interest in doing so. Denmark has a strong interest in engaging in 
alliances with other, stronger states due to the country’s relative weakness. However, such states 
might not have an interest in Denmark as an ally if Denmark is not able to participate and deliver 
when needed. Arguably, this was the case during the Cold War, where Denmark participated in 
the NATO alliance only to the extent that it could, due to its placement as a frontline state. In this 
sense, it is understandable that the Danish military has cooperated closely with the British both 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is so for two reasons, first that the United Kingdom is still a great 
power, but probably more importantly that the United Kingdom itself has a so-called special 
relationship with the United States. As such, keeping close ties with the United Kingdom could 
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mean that Denmark will continue to have close ties with the United States, especially as it is hard 
to see what the US by itself could use Denmark for to put it bluntly. This is even more the case 
considering that the US has recently sought to shift its focus to the Asia-Pacific region in the so-
called strategic pivot, meaning that a country of roughly 5.5 million people in Northern Europe is 
hardly on the top the agenda. Making Denmark an attractive ally for the United Kingdom could 
thus come to mean a difference if the security environment changes for the worse for Denmark 
again.  
 
Taking these theoretical considerations further, the types of missions selected have arguably also 
been an important part of gaining, maintaining, and demonstrating power. As underlined in the 
1991-1992 Gulf War and almost all subsequent military operations where Western militaries 
have been involved, the technological edge have been a deciding factor. Smart weapons such as 
laser and GPS guided bombs have meant that Western militaries have won decisive victories in 
recent conflicts. However, as the Iraq and especially Afghanistan missions have shown, being 
able to fight still matters. In Afghanistan, Danish soldiers have been involved in high intensity 
conflict, where the enemy shoots back, and lives and limbs are lost. This is arguably also the 
case in relation to both the Libya intervention and the anti-piracy campaign in the Gulf of Aden, 
even though these operations are markedly different than the Afghanistan deployment. As 
written above in the discussion on classic realism, this has meant that Danish soldiers have 
learned invaluable lessons in relation to fighting, as argued by Chief of Defence Peter Bartram. 
This is of course not to say that the basis for involvement in these operations has been mere 
training, but in essence they have taught the armed forces lessons that could not have been 
learned in any other way. As defence analyst Pierre M. Sprey argue, “Weapons are not the most 
important ingredient in winning wars. People come first; ideas are second and hardware only 
third” (Sprey 2011). As such, being able to fight is arguably just as important as being willing to 
demonstrate this ability in relation to classic realism.   
 
6.4 Summary 
 
Despite the lack of clear and defined threats, Denmark has therefore followed an activist security 
and defence policy since the Cold War because even for a small state, self-determination is 
important. In order to preserve this self-determination, a state can follow policies that would 
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either maintain its relative power, or a policy which increases relative power. Arguably, 
Denmark has done just that by first restructuring the armed forces from a mobilized defence 
force, to a lean but mean fighting force capable of being deployed virtually anywhere in the 
world. As shown above, being able to fight is important in a realist’s world. Furthermore, it has 
been just as important to demonstrate the willingness to use force is necessary. This is both in 
order to dissuade anyone from interfering in Danish interests and to make Denmark an attractive 
ally for other states.  
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7.0 Future perspectives for activist security and defence policy 
 
Above, it was shown that Denmark has pursued an activist security and defence policy since the 
end of the Cold War, and that this was arguably done in order to maintain or enhance Danish 
influence and power in the international system. However, what about the future perspectives for 
such policy?  
 
It would seem that activism in security and defence policy will remain a key factor in Denmark’s 
international engagements, especially as the current centre-left government has a focus on an 
active and responsible foreign policy in its government platform. Furthermore, it is noted that 
Denmark must offer active support to continued international peace and safety, and that the 
Danish military should continue to be able to deliver military units capable of rapid and effective 
deployment in international operations (The government platform 2011; 39). Even though the 
same document states that it will be a principle of Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt’s 
government to only deploy Danish troops internationally with two-thirds of the parliament in 
support, this means that the activist security and defence policy will continue.  
 
However, while this might be the motive, the financial crisis has not gone the Danish armed 
forces by. Recently, a new Chief of Defence was appointed. One of his main tasks was to find 
savings worth 3 billion DKK in the defence budget (Berlingske 26 March 2012a). As written 
above, the current deployment costs around 1.2 billion DKK alone, and as such, Peter Bartram, 
who became the new Chief of Defence, could not simply count on the anticipated withdrawal 
from Afghanistan as the only means to find the savings, as he would come up 1.8 billion short. 
The bigger issue in this context is of course what happens to international deployments when the 
Department of Defence is suddenly faced with a 13,5 % cut in funding. However, it would seem 
that the 3 billion DKK that needs to be saved have already been found, as a coming analysis 
from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Defence, and consulting company McKinsey, will 
show that it is possible to save 2.7 billion DKK through the regular methods of increasing 
efficiency and making more wise defence procurements. On top of this comes the possible 
income from selling off unused equipment (Weekendavisen 15 June 2012).  
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Therefore, the question becomes not as much the international operations as such, but rather the 
type of operation and how the Danish armed forces should be structured to deal with these 
operations. One of the ideas is that of Smart Defence, which basically means that Denmark 
should invest in military capabilities that can complement that of the country’s allies, as argued 
by the Social-Liberal Party’s defence spokesman Zenia Stampe. One of her arguments is that 
new and modern defence equipment has become so expensive that most countries cannot afford 
to procure weapons from every single branch of modern military equipment. Allied countries can 
thereby buy into different branches and share resources (b.dk – Fremtidens forsvar er mindre og 
målrettet). This has some inherent problems of course, in the sense that some countries might 
want to buy the same equipment and such, but probably more importantly that some countries 
would dislike their capabilities and equipment being used in a conflict where they have no 
interest in participating.  
 
However, what is arguably more interesting in relation to this paper is that neither Stampe nor 
Thorning-Schmidt argues against participation in international operations. As such, it would 
seem that Danish participation in international military operations in the future will be primarily 
a question of form, not principle. Denmark will therefore highly likely continue on the path of 
activism in security and defence policy for the foreseeable future. Self-determination and being 
able to influence international politics as much as possible is therefore arguably a consideration 
that Denmark will continue to take in the future.     
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8.0 Conclusion 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, Denmark has participated in several military operations. In this 
paper, I have sought to answer why this is so, even though several Defence Commission reports 
and Defence Agreements have stated that there exist no clear and defined threats to Denmark. 
However, when studying Denmark’s actions in a classic realist perspective, things can make 
more sense. Classic realists, such as Hans J. Morgenthau argue that human nature guides how 
states behave in international politics. And because human nature is inherently competitive and 
affected by conflict, so is the relationship between states. Because of this competition, states seek 
power above all other interests, as it is only power that can ensure their continued self-
determination and give them the ability to either avoid having other states’ will imposed on them 
or impose their will on others. States can either seek to maintain, gain, or demonstrate their 
power, which is always to be measured relatively in comparison with other states. For these 
reasons, classic realism is normally described as dealing only with the great powers in the 
system, as they posses relatively more power than the small states. In fact, Morgenthau argues 
that the very existence of smaller states can become a function of the opposition and competition 
between the great powers. However, all states share the same characteristics in the sense that 
they all seek to maintain at least their self-determination, and possibly gain more power 
relatively. As such, classic realism can also be used as a theory when studying small powers. 
Small powers arguably just have to tread more carefully than the great powers.  
 
This is the argument in Carsten Due-Nielsen and Nikolaj Petersen’s adaptation and activism 
thesis. Due-Nielsen and Petersen’s theory deals with two main variables, stress sensitivity and 
influence capability. Small states traditionally have high stress sensitivity and low influence 
capability. This was especially the case for Denmark during the Cold War where Denmark was 
caught up in the great ideological conflict between East and West. In this period, Denmark was a 
frontline state in the conflict, and it therefore had to tread carefully on the international stage. 
However, as the Cold War ended, Denmark’s stress sensitivity fell dramatically and therefore 
influence capability became higher in the sense that Denmark could now become more active on 
the international stage without fear of repercussions from the great powers. Here it is important 
to remember that according to classic realism, power is the main interest of a state, as it is only 
its own power that can ensure continued self-determination. Arguably, an increase in influence 
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capability can be understood as gaining more power, or demonstrating power, the reason being 
that being influential on others can lead them to take decisions that they might not otherwise 
have done. Therefore, whereas Denmark during the Cold War sought to merely preserve its self-
determination, the absence of threat after the Cold War meant that Denmark could gain more 
power and influence via becoming more activist in not only foreign policy, but also in security 
and defence policy. 
 
That this is the case can be shown by comparing and analyzing the reports from the three 
Defence Commissions published in 1988, 1997, and 2008 with the several Defence Agreements 
passed by parliament in the same period. The reports are supposed to give politicians in 
parliament and government a foundation on which they can make informed decisions in relation 
to the security and defence policy of Denmark, and they are based on the thoughts and inputs 
from military officers, academics, and politicians. The reports give a good view of the security 
environment anticipated for Denmark in the future, and they also give suggestions as to what 
should be decided upon in relation to security and defence policy. As shown in this paper, often 
the recommendations from the Commissions’ have found their way into the various Defence 
Agreements. Besides highlighting the political developments in the period since the end of the 
Cold War, the several military operations that Denmark has participated have also been 
described and analyzed along with the above mentioned reports and agreements. As this analysis 
has shown, Denmark has had an activist security and defence policy since the end of the Cold 
War, symbolized by the great number of international military operations that the country has 
participated in during this period.  
 
On the basis of these historical and political developments, the adaptation and activism thesis has 
shown that even though Denmark continued to remain a small power in the time period since the 
Cold War, the lack of a territorial threat has meant that Denmark has been able to pursue an 
activist security and defence policy, because stress sensitivity became low after the Cold War. 
This meant that Denmark’s influence capability became higher, leading to international activism. 
In order to become adapted to this policy of activism, the Danish armed forces have been 
transformed from a mobilized defence force into a leaner but meaner military force, capable of 
international deployments. As such, the Danish military is no longer passively defending, but 
actively engaged in preventing threats.  
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Morgenthau’s classic realism shows why it is important even for a small state to be involved in 
international politics. Self-determination and sovereignty matters for states, and in order to at 
least preserve self-determination, states can seek to maintain, increase, or demonstrate their 
power. Denmark has since the end of the Cold War transformed its military into a more potent 
fighting force, meaning that relative power has at least been maintained. Furthermore, while the 
characteristics of the missions have varied, the latest operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and 
in the Gulf of Aden have been characterised by more high intensity conflict and operational 
tempo, meaning that invaluable lessons have been learned. Being able to fight when it matters 
can come to mean the difference in the grim world of classic realism. Besides this development, 
the many military operations that Denmark has participated in since the end of the Cold War has 
shown, or demonstrated, that Denmark has become willing to fight when it is necessary. Being 
able and willing to fight sends a clear signal of intent, both in the negative and positive sense. In 
the negative sense because it shows that a state is able and willing to stand up to an aggressor, 
and in the positive sense that it is easier to find allies if a state can show others that being allied 
with it actually matters.  
 
Therefore, the classic realist explanation as to why Denmark has pursued an activist security and 
defence policy since the end of the Cold War is that the absence of threat has led to low stress 
sensitivity and as a result increased influence capability. In order to be able to utilize this 
influence capability, an activist security and defence policy has been sought by Denmark. This 
has led to a restructuring of the armed forces into a leaner but meaner fighting force capable of 
international deployment. Thereby, Denmark has maintained its relative power and influence, 
and shown that it is willing and able to fight and use military power if required. Maintaining 
power and influence, and being willing and able to fight is important for states, because in 
classic realism, self-determination and sovereignty is important.  
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